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Abstract

The majority of research on covert networks uses social network analysis (SNA)
to determine critical members (leaders, technical experts, or key operatives) of the
network to either kill or capture for the purpose of network destabilization. This thesis
takes the opposite approach and evaluates potential scenarios for inserting an agent into a
covert network for information gathering purposes or future disruption operations. An
insertion scenario consists of one or more members of the network with whom an
inserted agent targets for relationship development. The agent leverages these
relationships to gain the desired effect on the network. Due to the substantial number of
potential insertion scenarios in a large network, evaluating all possible scenarios can
require hours of computational time. This research proposes three screening heuristics
that leverage SNA measures to reduce the solution space before applying a simple search
heuristic. Each heuristic is tested on networks of various sizes and types for accuracy and
time and compares these results to a “brute force” all-scenarios model. All presented
heuristics reduce the computational time by 99%, with one heuristic averaging a 0.90
accuracy across all test networks.
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SCREENING HEURISTICS FOR THE EVALUATION OF COVERT NETWORK
NODE INSERTION SCENARIOS

I. Introduction

1.1 Background
The 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) and The
Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2020-2024 identify the
international and domestic threats to the United States (US). These threats fall into three
categories: near-peer competitors, regional actors, and non-state actors. China and Russia
are the near-peer competitors, aggressively asserting themselves on the world stage to
gain global influence. They are the primary focus of the national security strategy.
Regional actors such as Iran and North Korea seek to disrupt regional stability, pursue
nuclear capabilities, and threaten the US and its allies. The final category ̶ and the focus
of this research ̶ are the transnational non-state actors that seek the attack the US and
undermine the American way of life, and they take the form of terrorist, violent
extremist, and transnational criminal organizations [1], [2].
All three types of non-state actors operate in the shadows of society, continually
evolving and leveraging technology to conceal their operations and members. Terrorist
and violent extremist organizations exploit the anonymity of the Internet to spread their
ideology and propaganda worldwide, radicalizing new recruits to violence [2]. Criminal
organizations have also leveraged the Internet to further their reach as they pursue
criminal activities that “include trafficking and smuggling of humans, drugs, weapons,
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and wildlife, as well as money laundering, corruption, cybercrime, fraud, and financial
crimes” [2]. Due to their desire to remain hidden, terrorist, extremist, and criminal
organizations are also referred to as either dark, clandestine, or covert organizations.
To counter the actions of these covert organizations, specifically terrorist and
violent extremist, the INSSG directs a whole of government approach, utilizing the “full
array of tools” to include law enforcement and intelligence capabilities, while ensuring
information sharing among agencies [1]. For the Department of Homeland Security,
actionable intelligence is the basis for their strategy to counter terrorist, extremist, and
criminal organizations:
Effective homeland security operations rely on timely and actionable
intelligence to accurately assess and prevent threats against the United States.
Accordingly, DHS works diligently to enhance intelligence collection,
integration, analysis, and information sharing capabilities to ensure partners,
stakeholders, and senior leaders receive actionable intelligence and information
necessary to inform their decisions and operations [2].
One tool being utilized by the US government to perform analysis of and to
counter covert organizations is social network analysis (SNA). Like societies and other
organizations, covert organizations consist of a network of people tied together by
relationships, ideas, and goals. SNA leverages the network structure and utilizes
elements of graph theory to draw key insights about the organization [3].
Covert networks present unique challenges to analysts, as these networks do not
follow certain norms seen in typical social networks. The need for secrecy and survival
affects how the network’s structure develops. For example, the structure of terrorist
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networks is usually cell-centric. The greatest density of relationships is within the cells,
with usually only one connection outside of the cell to other parts of the network. The
relationships or connections that do exist within the network are difficult to detect as the
members are focused on hiding those connections. Due to the emphasis placed on hiding
the network, the lack of information about the network further challenges analysis of the
network [4].
Previous studies of covert networks focused on node deletion as a means of
causing disruption in covert networks through the targeting, capturing, or killing of key
members within the network [5]. The opposite approach of node deletion is node
insertion. Node insertion entails inserting an agent or sensor into a network with a goal
of establishing relationships with members of the covert network and leveraging those
relationships to gain the desired effect on the network. A review of the literature
highlights a considerable gap in research on the use of node insertion within the context
of covert networks. This gap in literature serves as the motivation for this study as
situations might dictate the need for an agent or sensor to be inserted into a covert
network for the purpose of future disruption or further intelligence gathering.
1.2 Problem Statement
With the current lack of research in the area of node insertion with respect to
covert networks, there exists a need for effective and efficient methods to determine the
most advantageous node insertion scenarios for a given covert network. Within the
context of this research, a node insertion scenario represents one, two, or three members
of the network that an agent who is inserted into the network should target for
relationship development and information gathering.
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The motivation for this research is the need to evaluate the extensive number of
insertion scenarios that result from large covert networks with over 150 members. For
instance, a network consisting of 200 members results in 200 scenarios targeting one
individual (one-target scenarios), 19,900 scenarios targeting two individuals (two-target
scenarios), and 1,313,400 scenarios targeting three individuals (three-target scenarios).
This results in 1,333,500 different scenarios to analyze to determine which scenarios are
the most advantageous to pursue, and this analysis requires many hours of computational
time. As the network size grows and the number of possible targets per scenario
increases, the number of possible insertion scenarios grow according to a power law. This
in turn greatly increases the computational time required to evaluate all possible insertion
scenarios.
1.3 Research Objectives
The main objective of this research is to provide a method to reduce the
computational time required to produce a list of the most advantageous insertion
scenarios within a covert network, while maintaining an adequate overall level of
accuracy. To accomplish this objective, this study provides a screening heuristic that
reduces the solution space by screening out unfavorable scenarios and then efficiently
searches the reduced space for the most advantageous scenarios. Three screening
heuristics, differing in their respective screening criteria, are presented in this paper:
neighbor-access screening, utility-score screening, and measure screening.
To accomplish the main objective, the study proposes a utility function to score
each scenario and serves as the objective function that the heuristic seeks to maximize.
The utility function consists of two subfunctions that quantify the benefit and risk
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associated with each insertion scenario. A weighted combination of common SNA
measures is used to calculate the benefit and risk scores for a given scenario, and weights
can be tuned depending on the operational context. The overall utility score of the
scenario is the weighted difference between the benefit and risk scores.
The goal of this research is to provide intelligence and law enforcement agencies
with a method to quickly develop a list of the most advantageous node insertion scenarios
within a large covert network. The outputs of the screening heuristics are intended to be
an initial step in the overall evaluation process of potential insertion scenarios and are not
intended to replace decision making without further analysis of the scenarios. The list of
advantageous scenarios produced by the screening heuristic will require additional
analysis by intelligence and infiltration subject matter experts (SMEs). Using the
proposed screening heuristics will reduce the number of scenarios requiring this
additional analysis, saving time.
1.4 Research Scope
The focus of this study is to develop a screening heuristic to efficiently and
accurately develop a list of advantageous insertion scenarios, given a specified covert
network. Insertion scenarios consist of one to three individuals within the network, with
whom an inserted agent should seek to develop a relationship in order gain a desired
effect. This research does not evaluate the network’s response to the agent’s insertion or
take into consideration any security measures of the covert network to seek out
infiltrators. The analysis of the actual process of and techniques used to insert an agent
into a covert network are outside the scope of this study. Classified information, to
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include current classified techniques to infiltrate a covert network are not used for this
research.
1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
The assumptions used for this methodology include the following:
1. Attributes of the network’s nodes and edges are not considered. This includes
geographical information of nodes. The edges within the network are undirected
and unweighted.
2. Networks are known with 100% certainty. All members and their respective
connections are known and present within the network at the time of analysis.
This is counter to the real world, where information on covert networks contains a
level of uncertainty and existing members of a network will be unknown to the
analyst.
3. The networks used for this research are not modeled dynamically, and therefore
represent the network at a given point in time.
4. Due to the lack of access to large covert network datasets, theoretical graph
generators will be used to generate the necessary networks for testing and
analysis.
5. Testing of the screening heuristic will be limited to networks consisting of 500
nodes or less. This is due to both time and access to computers with required
processing power.
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1.6 Thesis Organization
This thesis contains four additional chapters. Chapter II provides an overview of
the supporting literature used during this research. Key topics covered in Chapter II
include an overview of the key SNA measures, screening heuristics, and an overview of
current research applying SNA techniques to covert networks. Chapter III develops the
methodology for the research and discusses the development of both the utility function
and screening heuristic. The methodology is then applied to the September 11th Terrorist
Network case study. Chapter IV discusses the testing procedure, results, and analysis of
the screening heuristic’s performance. Chapter V provides a discussion of the
conclusions gained from the research and provides areas for future research.
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II. Literature Review

2.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides an overview of current literature on the topics of covert
networks and SNA. The chapter starts with an overview of characteristics of covert
networks and is followed by discussions of key SNA measures used to evaluate networks
at both the node and network level. The chapter concludes with a review of current
research applying SNA techniques to the destabilization of covert networks.
2.2 Covert Networks
According to The Mitchell Centre for Social Network Analysis covert networks
“are social networks, which have one or many elements of secrecy about it” [6]. Covert
networks form around a given activity, ideology, or purpose that is either illegal,
dangerous, or otherwise deemed unacceptable by societal norms. Examples of covert
networks include protest movements, underground resistance movements, espionage
groups, people that participate in certain sexual behaviors, extremist, terrorists, and
criminal organizations [6].
For this research the term “covert networks” refers to terrorist, extremist, and
criminal organizations, with the primary focus on terrorist organizations. This is a
common use and scope of the term throughout the literature reviewed.
2.2.1 Covert Network Structure
The consensus amongst researchers is that most terrorist organizations take on a
hub-and-spoke or cellular structure [7]. Initially, this was not the case as the structures of
these organizations were more hierarchical in nature. Yet, mainly through the advent of
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the Internet, these organizations gained a global reach resulting in distributed and
decentralized operations forcing the organizations to adopt the hub-and-spoke structure
commonly seen today [8].
The hub-and-spoke or cellular structure of covert networks serves as a protection
mechanism for the organization, limiting the effects of disruption and helping to maintain
secrecy. Communication and knowledge of operations between cells are limited, with
only the cell leadership having operational connections outside of the cell. Cell members
only maintain limited intra-cell connections [7]. A few cell members do maintain what
Tsvetovat et al. [9] refer to as “sleeper links.” These links are non-operational
connections to members of other cells, usually in the form of family ties or shared
experiences like training, that can be activated as the need arise. These “sleeper links”
and other network characteristics help to maintain redundancies so that flow of
information or resources is not disrupted if a critical node or cell is discovered and
removed from the network [9], [7].
Network hubs, the more connected members of the network, coordinate
operations and facilitate information flow between cells as needed. The hubs are usually
not leaders within the network but help to reduce the distance that information is required
to travel between leadership and cells. Removing hubs from the network can cause major
disruptions to the network [7], but Tsvetovat et al. [9] argue that activation of the “sleeper
links” can help to mitigate the disruption.
Despite terrorist organizations sharing an overarching hub-and-spoke structure,
individual organizational structures do differ in many ways. This is highlighted by
Carley [10] in her comparison of the structures of al Qaida and Hamas. Both
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organizations have an underlying cellular structure, but the organization and make up
these cells differ between groups. Table 1 highlights the key differences between these
groups.

Table 1. General Features of Terrorist Groups [10]

The al Qaida organization maintained an overarching hierarchy built around
Usama bin Laden. Below bin Laden was a council of his deputies that oversaw specific
functions in the areas of religion, military, finance, and media. Below bin Laden and his
deputies were the dispersed and decentralized operational cells of the organization.
These cells were multi-functional in the sense that members of the cells contained the
various skill sets required for the cell to be operationally effective, independent of the rest
of the organization. These cells were free to plan, fund, and conduct small operations
autonomously. Larger operations, like the September 11th Attack, were conducted by
10

multiple cells through the coordination and funding provided by bin Laden and his
deputies [10].
Hamas’s cellular structure is organized based on region and function. Each
region (West Bank, Egypt, etc.) contains functional cells or groups: internal security
group, uprisings group, suicide bomber group, professional killer group and a support
group [10]. The functional groups report to both a regional leader and an overarching
functional leader at the Hamas headquarters. The regional and overarching functional
leaders report directly to the Hamas leader. For operations, coordination between groups
within a region is required to ensure the required skillsets are available. In certain
regions, the cells may remain dormant until activated for an operation [10].
The United States military maintains a similar view on the structures of covert
networks (referred to in doctrine as “threat networks”) as academia. In Joint Publication
3-25: Countering Threat Networks (JP 3-25), the compartmentalization of the network is
critical to the network’s survival. The goal of this compartmentalization is to reduce any
single individual’s knowledge on the network’s operations or members. This is to reduce
risk to the network if an individual is detained [11]. Figure 1 depicts a notional network
structure as presented in JP 3-25.
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Figure 1. Depiction of a Notional Covert Network from Joint Publication 3-25 [11]

2.3 Social Network Analysis (SNA)
SNA is “the analysis of systems of social relationships represented by networks”
[12]. SNA is rooted in graph theory, which models graphs or networks as a system of
points and lines. Information about a network is gained through graph theory’s
leveraging of information contained within the network’s structure and properties [12].
In SNA, social networks and organizations are represented as a system of points,
called nodes, and lines, called edges. Members of a social network are represented by
nodes and the connections between the members are represented by the edges. The
information about the network is normally contained within a square adjacency matrix,
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where the rows and columns represent the individuals, and values in the matrix cells
represent a connection [12]. Within the network, nodes can also represent collectives
such as tribes, countries, or teams. Characteristics about nodes are captured in the form
of attributes and help to distinguish between the nodes [13]. By weighting edges, the
strength of a relationship can be captured. Directional edges can be used to represent
information flow within the network [12].
Borgatti et al. [13] describes the three levels of social network analysis: dyad,
node, and network. At the dyad level of analysis, pairwise relationships between network
members are the focus. Node level analysis aggregates dyad measures to determine
insights into the individual member, such as the member’s positioning or influence within
the network. The final level of analysis is the network level. At this level, measures seek
to describe the network as a whole, such as the density of relationships or the diameter of
the network [13]. The following sections describe key measures at the network and node
level, followed by a discussion of various network types.
2.3.1 Network Level Measures
The initial set of network measures consists of density, diameter, and average
path length. The density of a network is the percentage of possible connections present
within a network. If a network contains five nodes there are ten possible connections
(𝑛(𝑛 − 1)⁄2) within the network. If there are five edges present, this results in a density
of 0.5 [13]. The diameter of the network is greatest path distance between any two nodes
in the network. The average path length is similar to diameter but calculates the average
of all shortest paths between all the nodes in the network [14].
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The next network measure, the clustering coefficient, seeks to determine the level
of clustering within a network. Jackson [14] describes clustering as “the extent to which
my friends are friends with one another.” The clustering coefficient was introduced by
Watts and Strogatz [15] in 1998 and is based on the transitivity of a set of three nodes. A
set of three nodes are considered transitive when all possible edges between the three
nodes are present. The clustering coefficient looks at all cases where two edges (ij and
ik) originate from the same node i, and determines how often, on average, the edge jk
exists. The clustering coefficient is also calculated for individual nodes in a similar
manner. Clustering coefficients help in identifying communities within a network [13],
[14], [15].
Modularity is a similar measure to the clustering coefficient, as it seeks to
determine the level of communities within a network. Newman and Garvin define
modularity as measuring “the fraction of the edges in the network that connect vertices of
the same type (i.e., within-community edges) minus the expected value of the same
quantity in a network with the same community divisions but random connections
between the vertices” [16]. The modularity value ranges from -0.5 to 1. If the number of
within-community edges is less than the random edges, modularity will be negative. If
modularity is close to one, the network has a strong community structure. Networks with
a modularity greater than 0.6 have a clear community structure [16], [17], [18].
The final network level measure is degree assortativity, which measures the
correlation between the degree of a node and the average degree of its neighbors. If this
correlation is positive and the assortativity coefficient is close to one, the network is
assortative, meaning nodes of high degree tend to be connected to other nodes of high
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degree. A disassortative network has a negative correlation, meaning nodes of high
degree are connected to many nodes of low degree. Assortativity can also be calculated
for various node attributes, which is useful in the study of homophily [18], [19].
2.3.2 Node Level Measures
Borgatti et al. [13] define centrality as “a class of theoretical constructs that
characterize a node’s position within the network structure,” and centrality analysis as
“the process of scoring each node in the network according to its structural importance.”
The driving idea behind centrality measures is that key members of a network are
centrally located within the network, and centrality measures allow analyst to identify
these key members. Jackson [14] notes that there are four categories of centrality
measures, based on their underlying statistical theory: degree, closeness, betweenness,
and neighbors’ characteristics.
The “simplest and perhaps the most intuitively obvious” form of centrality is
degree centrality, which is based on the node’s degree, or the number of edges that
connect with the node [20]. The underlying idea is that the more connections an
individual has, the more central they are positioned in the network, and the more
individuals they can influence compared to an individual with a low degree. Degree
centrality is commonly used with undirected networks where any arc weights are ignored.
Degree centrality can also be used with directed networks in the form of in-degree and
out-degree centrality. It is calculated by summing the row values within the adjacency
matrix [21]. Degree centrality is commonly normalized by dividing by (𝑛 − 1) [14].
Jackson highlights a weakness of degree centrality by emphasizing that this form
of centrality does not take into consideration the quality of the adjacent nodes. For
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example, an individual with a lower degree but whose links are with influential
individuals are more central in the network than an individual that has a higher degree but
whose adjacent nodes are uninfluential and positioned on the periphery of the network
[14].
The next category of centrality measures is closeness centrality. As the name
implies, closeness centrality captures how close a node is to all other nodes in the
network. When discussing information flow across a network, individuals with a higher
closeness centrality will receive information quicker as it spreads across the network
[21]. The equation for the normalized closeness centrality is
𝑐𝑖𝑐 =

(𝑛 − 1)
∑𝑗∈𝑉:𝑗≠𝑖 𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗)

(2.1)

where d(i, j) is the shortest path distance from node i to node j [20].
Jackson identifies a second form of closeness centrality called decay centrality,
𝑐𝑖𝑑 = ∑ 𝛿 𝑑(𝑖,𝑗)

(2.2)

𝑗∈𝑉:𝑗≠𝑖

that utilizes the decay parameter, δ, with a value of 0< δ<1. As δ approaches zero, more
weight is given to closer nodes [14].
Betweenness centrality is the third category of centrality as described by Jackson.
Freeman [20] introduced the concept of betweenness centrality in 1977 and describes it
as a measure of how well an individual is positioned between others in the network
allowing them to “facilitate, impede or bias the transmission of messages.” The equation
for the normalized form of betweenness centrality is
𝑐𝑖𝑏 = ∑

𝑃𝑖 (𝑘𝑗)/𝑃(𝑘𝑗)
𝑘≠𝑗;𝑖∉{𝑘,𝑗} (𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)/2
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(2.3)

where 𝑃𝑖 (𝑘𝑗) is the number of shortest paths between k and j that i falls, 𝑃(𝑘𝑗) is the total
number of shortest paths between k and j, and n is the total number of nodes. As a node’s
betweenness approaches one, the more central the node is considered [14].
Stephenson and Zelen [22] argued that betweenness centrality is narrow in its
scope as information and communication does not travel only on shortest paths within a
social network. They proposed a calculation that determines the centrality of a node
based on the total number of paths on which a given node is located. They refer to this
measure as information centrality [22]. When working with an unweighted graph the
𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix 𝑩 = (𝑏𝑖𝑗 ) is derived from the following:
𝑏𝑖𝑗 = {

0,
1,

nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗 are incident
otherwise

𝑏𝑖𝑖 = 1 + degree of node 𝑖

(2.4)
(2.5)

The information centrality of node i (𝑐𝑖𝐼 ) is
𝑐𝑖𝐼 = (

1
)
𝑘𝑖𝑖 + (𝑇 − 2𝑅)/𝑛

(2.6)

where 𝑲 = (𝑘𝑖𝑗 ) = 𝑩−1 , 𝑇 = ∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑘𝑗𝑗 , and 𝑅 = ∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑘𝑖𝑗 [22].
The final category of centrality, as discussed by Jackson, consists of those
measures that include the characteristics of a node’s neighbors within the calculation.
These measures are based on the idea that one’s importance or influence within a network
is not merely based on the quantity of connections or position within the network, but the
quality of those connections [14].
Bonacich describes eigenvector centrality as “a measure of centrality in which a
unit’s centrality is its summed connections to others, weighted by their centralities” [23].
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Borgatti describes eigenvector centrality as a measure of popularity: nodes with high
eigenvector centrality are connected to other nodes that are well connected. Borgatti
continues to describe how eigenvector centrality can be used to measure risk within a
network, using the risk of disease transmission within a network as an example [13]. The
equation for eigenvector centrality (𝑐𝑖𝑒 ) in matrix notation is
𝑨𝑥⃑ = 𝜆𝑥⃑

(2.7)

where A is the adjacency matrix of the graph, 𝜆 is the largest eigenvalue, and 𝑥⃑ is the
vector of eigenvector centralities. 𝑐𝑖𝑒 is the ith element of 𝑥⃑ [23].
A similar centrality to eigenvector centrality was proposed by Leo Katz in 1953
and used to calculate a node’s status or influence within a network. This has become
known as Katz centrality. This centrality measures the number of nodes that are
immediately connected to the node of interest. It then measures the number of nodes that
connect to the node of interest through the immediate neighbors. These distant nodes are
penalized by 𝛼 𝑘 , where k is the distance from the distant node to the node of interest, and
𝛼 is an attenuation factor that is set less than 1⁄𝜆

𝑚𝑎𝑥

[24], [25].

In 2013 Qi et al. presented the Laplacian centrality measure that utilizes
Laplacian energy to measure the “centrality of a vertex based on the idea that the
importance of a vertex is related to the ability of the network to respond to the
deactivation or removal of that vertex from the network” [26]. This centrality measure
looks to capture the amount of Laplacian energy that the network loses when a node and
its corresponding edges are removed from the network. The greater the energy lost after
node removal, the greater the importance of the node in the network [26].
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Laplacian centrality is calculated using the Laplacian matrix of the network. The
Laplacian matrix of network G is calculated by L(G) = D(G) – A(G), where D(G) is a
diagonal matrix where 𝑑𝑖𝑖 is the degree of node i and A(G) is the adjacency matrix of
network G. Utilizing the eigenvalues (𝜆𝑖 ) of the Laplacian matrix, the Laplacian energy
for G (𝐸𝐿(𝐺)) is calculated by
𝑛

𝐸𝐿 (𝐺) = ∑ 𝜆2𝑖

(2.8)

𝑖=1

Node degree can also be used to calculate 𝐸(𝐺):
𝑛

𝐸𝐿 (𝐺) = ∑(𝑑𝑖2 + 𝑑𝑖 )

(2.9)

𝑖=1

where 𝑑𝑖 is the degree of node i. This results in the Laplacian centrality of node i as
𝑐𝑖𝐿 = (𝛥𝐸)𝑖 = 𝐸𝐿 (𝐺) − 𝐸𝐿 (𝐻)

(2.10)

where H is the resulting network after node i is removed from network G [26]. The above
equation can be further defined as
𝑐𝑖𝐿 = (𝛥𝐸)𝑖 = 𝑑𝐺2 (𝑖) + 𝑑𝐺 (𝑖) + 2 ∑ 𝑑𝐺 (𝑗)

(2.11)

𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖)

where N(i) is the set of neighbors of node i [26].
There are many more measures within SNA to determine the importance or status
of nodes, including variations on the above. Guzman et al. [27] researched the
relationships between 24 common measures to determine if there is any statistical
dependence between the measures. Table 2 displays the four groups found by the study
where measures in each group are highly correlated with each other [27].
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Table 2. Groups of Highly Correlated Measures [27]
Group 1
Clustering coefficient
Soffer's clustering coefficient
Squares clustering coefficient

Group 2
Betweenness centrality
Stress centrality
Length-scaled betweenness
Linearly-scaled betweenness
k -betweenness
Random walk betweenness
Proximal source betweenness

Group 3
Load centrality
Proximal target betweenness

Group 4
Degree Centrality
Pagerank

Table 3 shows the measures that were found to be uncorrelated with any of the
other 24 measures.

Table 3. Uncorrelated Network Measures [27]
Measure
Closeness centrality
Eigenvector centrality
Communicability centrality
Simple diversity
General diversity
Communicabilitybetweenness
Current flow betweenness
Approx. current flow betweenness
Closeness vitality
Average neighbor degree

Borghatti et al. [28] researched the robustness of centrality measures in the
presence of random error in network data. The study used node addition, node deletion,
edge addition, and edge deletion to replicate the error within the network, and their
effects on degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centralities. The results of the
study show that accuracy of the measures declines “smoothly and predictably with the
amount of error.” The authors suggest that this relationship between accuracy and error
will allow for the construction of confidence intervals for centrality measures. Another
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key insight from the study is that measures of large dense networks are more robust for
all error types except edge deletion [28]. This research is important to using SNA
measures on covert networks, as their secretive nature makes it difficult to collect all
information on the network.
2.3.3 Network Structures
A small-world network is characterized by a high clustering coefficient, similar to
a lattice graph, and a small average path length between nodes similar to a random graph.
The common “six degrees of separation” concept is based on a small-world network [15].
Watts and Strogatz [15] proposed a method of generating small-world networks. The
model initializes with a lattice graph of n nodes that are connected to their k nearest
neighbors. Then moving around the ring clockwise, each edge is selected. With a
probability of p, the edge is rewired to another node that is uniformly selected. With a
probability of (1-p) the edge is not rewired. Figure 2 shows the random rewiring process
where n=20 and k=4 [15].

Figure 2. Random Rewiring Procedure from a Regular Ring Lattice to a Random
Network [15]

Random graphs are graphs where edges between nodes are added to a network
based on some probability. One of the most famous models for generating a random
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graph was introduced by Paul Erdős and Alfred Rényi in 1959. Their model uses two
parameters, n for the number of desired nodes in the network and p the probability that an
edge is formed. The model initializes by creating the n nodes. Then the model iterates
across every possible edge and adds it to the network with a probability of p. Edge
insertion is independent of the other edges in or out of the network [30]. Random graphs
might seem simple, but they help to provide insight into properties of social networks
[14].
The third network structure is the scale-free network. These networks have
degree distributions that follow a power law distribution. Due to the nature of this
distribution and the size of its tails, highly connected hub-nodes have a high probability
of occurring [29]. A modeling method for scale-free networks was presented by Barabási
and Albert. Unlike Erdős–Rényi and Watts-Strogatz network models, the Barabási–
Albert model does not start with all n nodes present. The model starts with m nodes and
at each iteration a new node is added with m edges that connect to nodes already present
in the network via preferential attachment. The probability, P, that a new node will
connect to node i depends on the connectivity (ki) of node i, which results in 𝑃(𝑘𝑖 ) =
𝑘𝑖
⁄∑ 𝑘 [29].
𝑗 𝑗
The final network structures are the connected caveman graph and one its
variations, the relaxed caveman graph. The caveman graphs are used to study clustering.
The connected caveman graph originates with l cliques consisting of k nodes. One edge
is rewired from each clique to connect all the cliques into a loop as depicted in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Connected Caveman Graph [31]
The relaxed caveman graph initializes with the same l cliques and k nodes but
incorporates a probability p that determines if each edge within the clique is rewired to
outside the clique [32]. This network structure closely resembles the cellular network
structure commonly seen in covert networks.
2.4 Current Research of Covert Networks
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, there has been an increased
interest into the research of covert networks, specifically terrorist networks, and methods
to counter them. After the attacks, government intelligence and defense agencies lacked
the skillset and abilities to properly analyze these networks. They, along with academia,
turned to SNA to fill this capability gap [27]. The following section discusses the
challenges that researchers face when applying SNA to covert networks along with a
review of current research focused on network disruption and intelligence gathering.
2.4.1 Data Challenges
In her review of current literature concerning terrorist networks, van der Hulst [7]
discusses the challenges facing current researchers when trying to utilize SNA principles
to study terrorist networks, and by extension covert networks. She identifies two types of
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researchers that are interested in the terrorist network problem set: operational analysts
and scientific researchers. The operational analysts are those individuals working for
government intelligence agencies that have access to classified information on terrorist
networks, but due to the classification, any research results they produce cannot be made
publicly available. The second group are members of academia who have the expertise
to model network behaviors but lack access to classified information and datasets, forcing
them to rely on open-source data or media reports. These data sources are usually
incomplete or wrong [7].
Diviak [33] expands on the above issues affecting the research of covert
networks. Due to inherent nature of covert networks and their members emphasis on
secrecy and compartmentalization, collecting complete datasets on these networks is
nearly impossible. Most unclassified datasets available to researchers are developed after
an attack has occurred, usually through the consolidation of information provided in news
reports and unclassified government reports. In many cases, these data sources are
incomplete or conflicting [33].
van der Hulst [7] discusses the effects of the above data challenges on the overall
covert network research effort: “In the absence of actual network metrics, however, most
of the work remains limited to the discussion of social networks as a paradigm, some
theoretical arguments, or basic qualitative analysis.” She continues by saying that many
papers are “essentially descriptive (but limited) or outline the potential value of SNA to
study clandestine networks,” resulting in few empirical studies or studies that test a
proposed hypothesis [7]. Asal and Rethemeyer [34] describe the research field as being
mainly “theory building with little empirical verification.”
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2.4.2 Network Disruption through Node Deletion
Current research on the topic of disruption of covert networks centers around the
removal of key nodes within the network. Carley et al. [35] use SNA and multi-agent
models to research how to destabilize covert networks. The study highlights the
difficulty of destabilizing large and distributed networks as well as those where the
network members are connected on various dimensions. In the study the authors model
networks dynamically and use meta-matrix representation. Both techniques enable the
model to capture a network’s ability to adapt, learn, and change over time [35].
Carley et al. [36] continues this line of research through the development of
DyNet, a tool that is used to simulate covert networks dynamically and uses a metamatrix modeling technique. Using DyNet, the study was able to simulate the effects of
various targeting and disruption strategies. The outcome of the research revealed that if
the individual removed from the network has a high cognitive load or task exclusivity this
has a greater effect than removing someone who is considered central to the social
network. Both removal strategies are slightly better than random node removal. In the
optimal organization structure where tasks and cognitive load are evenly dispersed
throughout the network, random removal increases in effectiveness.
Tsvetovat et al. [9] also use multi-agent simulations to test network disruption
strategies. Their findings showed similar results to the above study, revealing that
removing experts and other key members based on role creates more permanent damage
to a cellular-structured network then the isolation of well-connected individuals. The
study also revealed that a cellular network has an emergent healing behavior that can
negate the effects of node loss after some time [9].
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Geffre et al. [37] developed a method to determine a quantitative value of
criticality based on three measures: “(1) the members’ social connectedness across multilayered affiliations, (2) their involvement in operations, and (3) their emergence during
periods and at locations of interest.” This multi-layered approach is displayed in Figure
4.

Figure 4. Multi-Layered Approach used by Geffre et al. [37] to Determine an Actor's
Critical Value

2.4.3 Network Disruption through Node Insertion
There currently is a lack of research into utilizing node insertion as a disruption
technique. One study conducted by Johnstone [38] utilizes a risk-based approach to
determine locations within a covert network to insert an agent for the purpose of
intelligence gathering or future disruption. In the study, Johnstone calculates a utility
score for each possible insertion scenario, where a scenario consists of one to four
members of the network of interest that are “targets” with whom an inserted agent should
develop a relationship. The utility consists of weighted benefit and risk values. Each of
these values are calculated using degree, subject matter expert (SME) rating, closeness
centrality, and Laplacian centrality. The method shows promise for identifying potential
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node insertion scenarios but becomes computationally expensive when utilized on large
networks [38].
2.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter provided an overview of the current literature with respect to covert
networks and SNA. The information gained through the literature review process will be
applied in the next chapter with the development of the study’s methodology.
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III. Methodology

3.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter details the research methodology and begins with a discussion of the
notation used throughout this chapter. Second, the method for insertion scenario scoring
is explained. This scoring method uses equations consisting of various SNA measures to
calculate risk and benefit scores. These scores are combined to create an overall utility
score for each insertion scenario. Next, the three screening heuristics are discussed to
include the screening criteria used by each heuristic to reduce the solution space. This is
followed by the presentation of the search portion of the heuristics that operate on the
reduced solution. Finally, the methodology is applied to case study using the September
11th Terrorist Network.
3.2 Notation
This paper uses the following terminology and notation throughout. Social
networks are referred to both as networks and graphs. Members of the social network
will be referred to as nodes, targets, members, or individuals. Edges, connections, and
relationships refer to the social links between members of the social network. The node
that is inserted into the network is either the agent or the sensor.
Each social network or graph of interest is defined as 𝐺(𝑉, 𝐸), where V is the set
of all nodes and E is the set of all edges. Nodes are represented as vi, where i is the index
of the node. Edges are represented as ei,j, where i and j are the indices of the nodes that
the edge connects. The inserted node, or the agent, is represented as va. The number of
nodes in graph G is |𝑉| = 𝑛 resulting in V={v1, v2,…,vn} and E={e0, e0,1,…,ei,j}.
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To represent a generic node insertion scenario, xs is the notation used, where s is
the set of all targets within the scenario. A more explicit representation of the insertion
scenarios is also used where xi is used for a one-target scenario, xi,j for a two-target
scenario, and xi,j,k for a three-target scenario, where i, j, and k are the indices of the nodes
with whom the agent targets for relationship development (network edge formation).
When the agent is inserted into the network, the network’s definition is modified to be
𝐺𝑥∗𝑠 (𝑉𝑥∗𝑠 , 𝐸𝑥∗𝑠 ).
Throughout this chapter, a trivial social network is used to help explain the
different aspects of the methodology (Figure 5). This network consists of seven
individuals and eleven edges, resulting in a network density of 0.52.

Figure 5. Example Network

3.3 Utility Function
The purpose of the utility function is to provide a measure of both benefit and
risk, as well as an overall score for each insertion scenario. Though not the primary focus
of this research, the utility function plays an important role, as it serves as the objective
function for the heuristic. The utility function utilized in this research is motivated, with
exceptions, by the similar utility function used by Johnstone [38] and is discussed in
Chapter II.
29

The utility function developed for this thesis consists of a weighted benefit score
and a weighted risk score defined as
𝑈𝑥𝑠 = 𝑤𝐵 𝐵𝑥𝑠 − 𝑤𝑅 𝑅𝑥𝑠

(3.1)

where 𝑈𝑥𝑠 , 𝐵𝑥𝑠 , and 𝑅𝑥𝑠 are the utility, benefit, and risk scores, respectively, associated
with node insertion scenario 𝑥𝑠 . The weights 𝑤𝐵 and 𝑤𝑅 are associated with benefit and
risk, respectively, and sum to one. Both benefit and risk are calculated using various
SNA measures and are discussed in greater detail below.
3.3.1 Benefit Score
For this research, we assume that the purpose of any node insertion is for
intelligence gathering on the network. Due to this assumption, two common SNA
measures are utilized to calculate the benefit score for each node insertion scenario:
eigenvector centrality and betweenness centrality. As discussed in Chapter II,
eigenvector centrality determines the centrality of individuals within a social network, not
by the mere numbers of connections an individual has, but by the quality of those
connections. An individual with a high eigenvector centrality is central to the network
because they are connected to other important individuals within the network. The
underlying principle of betweenness centrality is that individuals that are positioned on a
higher number of shortest paths between network members have a greater access to
information flowing through the network than those individuals positioned on fewer
shortest paths. Since the assumed goal is to collect information on the network, the
inserted agent needs to develop relationships with individuals who have access to
important members of the network and are better positioned to intercept information flow
between members.
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The formula for the benefit score is constructed as
𝐵𝑥𝑠 = 𝑤𝑒 ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑒 + 𝑤𝑏 ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑏
𝑖∈𝑆

(3.2)

𝑖∈𝑆

where S is the set of targets in scenario 𝑥𝑠 , 𝑐𝑖𝑒 is the eigenvector centrality for target i, and
𝑐𝑖𝑏 is the betweenness centrality of target i. These centrality measures are calculated
using 𝐺𝑥∗𝑠 (𝑉𝑥∗𝑠 , 𝐸𝑥∗𝑠 ). 𝑤𝑒 and 𝑤𝑏 , where 𝑤𝑏 = 1 − 𝑤𝑒 , are the respective weights for the
two centralities. The weights allow the analyst to emphasize one measure over the other
within the benefit score. Instances may arise where the agent’s access to important
individuals within the network is more import than positioning to intercept information
flow. In this case, 𝑤𝑒 can be set higher than 𝑤𝑏 .
3.3.2 Risk Score
The risk calculation uses two SNA measures and a cost factor for each
relationship the agent develops. The first measure used to determine risk of the insertion
scenario is closeness centrality (𝑐𝑎𝑐 ). As discussed in Chapter II, closeness centrality
measures how close a member of the network is to all other members of the network by
utilizing the shortest path distance from the node of interest to all other nodes in the
network. A member is more central within a network if the individual has a higher
closeness centrality value. For node insertion, executing an insertion scenario that results
in the agent having a high closeness centrality could increase the likelihood of the agent
being detected.
The second SNA measure used to calculate risk is degree assortativity, a network
level measure. As discussed in Chapter II, degree assortativity (𝛾) is a measure of the
distribution of the degrees of connected nodes. Networks with a positive assortativity
contain a large portion of high degree nodes connected to other nodes of high degree.
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Within the context of node insertion, if the insertion scenario does not conform to the
existing connection patterns within the network, there will be a larger change in degree
assortativity, and the agent could be more susceptible to detection. By using the change
in degree assortativity (∆𝛾) from before and after agent insertion within the risk
calculation, the change in the network’s status quo is captured.
The final aspect of the risk calculation is a standard cost factor (𝛿), which
represents the costs associated with establishing each relationship in the insertion
scenario. The value of the cost factor is established by the analyst in coordination with
intelligence SMEs and ranges between zero and one. The cost factor plays an important
role within the utility function, where it is multiplied by the number of relationships the
agent is to establish in the insertion scenario. Without the cost factor, the utility function
will not capture the risk associated with developing multiple relationships within the
covert network. As the number of relationships the agent pursues increases, the
likelihood of the agent being detected is expected to increase. The cost factor tries to
capture this risk.
The equation for the risk calculation is
𝑅𝑥 = 𝑤𝑐 𝑐𝑎𝑐 + 𝑤𝛾 (|∆𝛾|) + 𝑟𝑥𝑠 𝛿

(3.4)

where 𝑐𝑎𝑐 is the closeness centrality of the agent after insertion and 𝑟𝑥𝑠 is the number of
targeted relationships in the insertion scenario 𝑥𝑠 (𝑟𝑥𝑠 = |𝑆|). The weights for closeness
centrality and change in degree assortativity are 𝑤𝑐 and 𝑤𝛾 , respectively, and sum to one.
3.3.3 Utility Function Applied to Example Network
For the network example in Figure 5, there are sixty-three possible insertion
scenarios when allowing the agent to create at most three relationships. There are seven
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scenarios where the agent develops a single relationship, twenty-one scenarios for two
relationships, and thirty-five scenarios for three relationships. For this example, only
thirteen of the possible sixty-three scenarios are analyzed. These thirteen scenarios were
selected to ensure certain points are made during the following explanations.
To calculate the utility score for each scenario, the initial step is calculating the
degree assortativity for 𝐺(𝑉, 𝐸), and is only required to be calculated once per network,
as this value will be the same across all possible scenarios. For the example network, the
initial degree assortativity is -0.196.
The remaining calculations within the utility function require 𝐺𝑥∗𝑠 (𝑉𝑥∗𝑠 , 𝐸𝑥∗𝑠 ), the
updated network once the agent is inserted and relationships are created between the
agent and the scenario’s targets. The next step is to calculate the eigenvector and
betweenness centrality for each target in the scenario, the closeness centrality for the
agent, and the new degree assortativity. Once the desired measures are known, the
scenario’s benefit, risk, and utility scores can be calculated. Once a scenario’s scores are
calculated, the agent and its respective relationships are removed from the network,
resetting back to 𝐺(𝑉, 𝐸).
Calculating the eigenvector, betweenness, and closeness centralities for every
possible 𝐺𝑥∗𝑠 (𝑉𝑥∗𝑠 , 𝐸𝑥∗𝑠 ) becomes computationally expensive, especially for large, dense
networks. Yet, capturing the effect of the agent’s insertion on the network and targets
could provide valuable information that can be utilized by the intelligence analysts in
post-analysis. For example, a major shift in the targets’ eigenvector centrality could
highlight a possible scenario where the new relationships and the agent could be easily
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detected. This is outside the scope of this research but can serve as a topic for future
research.
Figure 6 shows the first insertion scenario, 𝑥0 , where the agent, 𝑣𝑎 , develops a
relationship with the target, 𝑣0 . The dotted line represents the new relationship that the
agent will pursue in the given scenario.

Figure 6. Network Representation of Scenario 𝑥0

Once the agent is inserted into the network and the corresponding relationships
are developed, the centrality measures and change in degree assortativity of the network
are calculated. The new degree assortativity for 𝐺𝑥∗0 (𝑉𝑥∗0 , 𝐸𝑥∗0 ) is -0.304, resulting in ∆𝛾 =
0.109. The following equations show the calculations for associated risk, benefit, and
utility scores for scenario 𝑥0 when using equal weights of 0.5 and a cost factor of 0.3.

𝐵𝑥0 = 0.5(0.393) + 0.5(0.111) = 0.252

(3.5)

𝑅𝑥0 = 0.5(0.412) + 0.5(0.109) + 1(0.3) = 0.561

(3.6)

𝑈𝑥0 = 0.5(0.252) − 0.5(0.561) = −0.155

(3.7)
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Table 4 shows the benefit, risk, and utility scores for the selected insertion
scenarios for the example network. The top three scenarios based on 𝑈𝑥𝑠 , in order, are
𝑥2,3 , 𝑥2,3,4, and 𝑥3 .

Table 4. Example Network Scenario Scores, with Top 3 Scenarios Highlighted
Scenario

|∆𝜸|

x0
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x0,6
x2,3
x2,4
x3,4
x2,3,4
x2,3,6

0.109
0.022
0.243
0.239
0.275
0.198
0.109
0.049
0.014
0.075
0.276
0.022
0.029

Benefit Score

Risk Score

Utility Score

𝐵𝑥𝑠

𝑅𝑥𝑠

𝑈𝑥𝑠

Ranking
(by 𝑈𝑥𝑠 )

0.252
0.109
0.265
0.406
0.328
0.253
0.222
0.514
0.783
0.549
0.768
1.030
0.790

0.561
0.530
0.616
0.638
0.671
0.632
0.573
0.875
0.840
0.888
1.007
1.203
1.206

-0.155
-0.211
-0.176
-0.116
-0.172
-0.190
-0.176
-0.181
-0.029
-0.170
-0.120
-0.087
-0.208

5
13
8
3
7
11
8
10
1
6
4
2
12

An important aspect of the utility scores is that the score for a scenario consisting
of multiple targets is not the sum of the individual utility scores for the individual targets.
For example, scenario 𝑥0,6 has a utility score of -0.181 and consists of the targets 𝑣0 and
𝑣6 . The utility score for scenario 𝑥0 (targeting 𝑣0 ) is -0.155 and for scenario 𝑥6
(targeting 𝑣6 ) is -0.176. The sum of these two scores is -0.331. The consequence of this
observation is that the utility score for each possible scenario must be calculated
individually.
One important observation is that high scoring individual targets, like 𝑣3 above,
tend to be a target in high scoring multitarget scenarios. Scenario 𝑥3 , consisting of target
𝑣3 , is the highest scoring single-target scenario. The three highest scoring multitarget
scenarios are 𝑥2,3 , 𝑥2,3,4, and 𝑥3,4 , and all three targets contain the target 𝑣3 . This idea
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that high scoring multitarget scenarios consist of high scoring single targets will be
leveraged in the next section to develop a screening function.
3.4 Screening Functions
The challenge of determining the most advantageous insertion scenarios for a
network is the mere number of possible scenarios. Table 5 shows the number of possible
insertion scenarios based on a network’s size and the number of targets. The growth
experienced by the number of possible insertion scenarios follows a power law
distribution as network size and number of targets per scenario increases (Figure 7). For
this research, scenarios are limited to a maximum of three targets, but four-target
scenarios are shown in Table 5 and Figure 7 to highlight how quickly the number of
possible scenarios exceeds one billion.

Table 5. Number of Insertion Scenarios per Network Size & Number of Targets
Network
Size
25
50
100
200
400
800

One Target
25
50
100
200
400
800

Number of Insertion Scenarios
Two Targets
Three Targets
300
2,300
1,225
19,600
4,950
161,700
19,900
1,313,400
79,800
10,586,800
319,600
85,013,600

Four Targets
12,650
230,300
3,921,225
64,684,950
1,050,739,900
16,938,959,800

Total Number
of Scenarios
15,275
251,175
4,087,975
66,018,450
1,061,406,900
17,024,293,800

Figure 7. Growth in the Number of Scenarios Follows a Power Law Distribution
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To reduce the solution space, specifically for network sizes greater than 150
nodes, this research developed three screening functions to reduce the total number of
scenarios and therefore the solution space that a heuristic will search. This research
utilizes the following three screening functions: neighbor-access, one-target utility score,
and SNA measure.
3.4.1 Neighbor-Access Screening
Neighbor-access is a concept developed during this research and is derived from
the concept of dispersion, discussed in Chapter II. Neighbor-access is the number of
members within the network with a shortest path distance of 2 from the agent, postinsertion. These are the members of the network that are directly connected to the
targets, and therefore, the agent would gain access to these members through the targets.
For single-target scenarios, the neighbor-access score is equivalent to the degree of the
target. The example network will be used next to further explain the calculation of this
score.
In the example network displayed in Figure 8. insertion scenario 𝑥0 has a
neighbor access score of three. By establishing a relationship with 𝑣0 the agent will have
access to 𝑣1 , 𝑣5 , and 𝑣6 . These three members all have a shortest path distance to the
agent equal to 2.

Figure 8. In Scenario 𝑥0 , the Agent Gains Access to the Members Highlighted in Blue by
Targeting 𝑣0 Resulting in a Neighbor-Access Score of 3
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There is no correlation between the number of targets in an insertion scenario and
the scenario’s neighbor-access score. In Figure 9, the scenario consists of the agent
developing relationships with 𝑣2 and 𝑣3 . Targeting 𝑣2 results in access to 𝑣3 and 𝑣4 , and
a relationship with 𝑣3 provides access to 𝑣2 , 𝑣4 , and 𝑣6 . Utilizing a shortest path
distance of 2 ensures that redundant neighbors of targets, and the targets themselves, are
not counted toward the neighbor access score. Since 𝑣4 and 𝑣6 are the only members
with a shortest path distance from the agent equal to 2, they are the only members
counted in the neighbor-access score, resulting in a neighbor access score of 2. This is
one less than the above scenario where there is one target, but the neighbor-access score
is three.

Figure 9. In Scenario 𝑥2,3 , the Agent Gains Access to the Members Highlighted in Blue
by Targeting 𝑣2 & 𝑣3 Resulting in a Neighbor-Access Score of 2
In initial testing, it was observed that scenarios with high utility scores tend to
have high neighbor-access scores, and therefore screening out scenarios with a low
neighbor-access score is a promising screening method for this research. This
relationship between utility scores and neighbor-access scores is understandable:
scenarios with higher neighbor-access scores have a higher number of connections which
can increase the targets’ eigenvector and betweenness centralities, both of which are used
to calculate the scenario’s benefit score.
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The neighbor-access screening algorithm consists of three steps. The first step is
to calculate the neighbor-access score for all possible scenarios. Then, within each
scenario type (one-target, two-target, etc.), the scenarios are ordered by their neighboraccess score, largest to smallest. Finally, for each scenario type, the top 𝛽 scenarios are
selected to be passed to the heuristic, where 𝛽 is a hyperparameter 𝛽 for this screening
technique. Figure 10 is the flowchart of the neighbor-access screening process.

Figure 10. Flowchart of the Neighbor-Access Screening Process
For this research the most targets per scenario analyzed is three. Therefore, three
values for 𝛽 are used: 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3. These separate hyperparameters allow the analyst
to select a different number of top scenarios from the one-target, two-target, and threetarget lists. This allows for the same portion of scenario type to be analyzed by the
search heuristic. For example, analyzing a 50-node network using a single 𝛽 of 15 results
in 15 one-target, 15 two-target, and 15 three-target scenarios being analyzed by the
search heuristic. This is 30%, 1%, and 0.076% of the possible one-target, two-target, and
three-target scenarios, respectively. Using three values for 𝛽 allows for an equal portion
of each scenario type to be analyzed. Furthermore, allowing three values for 𝛽 allows for
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comparison with the other screening functions to ensure the same number of scenarios
are available for the respective heuristic to evaluate.
The output of the neighbor-access screening function consists of a list of scenarios
for each scenario type. These lists are then passed to a search heuristic for analysis of the
solution space with respect to the utility function.
3.4.2 Utility Score Screening
As discussed in Section 3.3, early testing showed that high scoring, multitarget
scenarios tend to consist of targets that individually scored high as a one-target scenario.
This research leverages this information to develop its second screening function called
utility score screening.
Utility score screening consists of three steps. The first step is calculating the
utility score for all single-target scenarios. Then, the targets are ranked from largest to
smallest based on their respective single-target utility scores. Finally, the top 𝜇 targets
are selected, where 𝜇 is the hyperparameter for this screening function and determines the
number of top targets that are selected. Figure 11 shows the flowchart for this process.

Figure 11. Flowchart of Utility-Score Screening Process
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The output of the utility score screening function is a ranked set of targets. This
set of targets is then passed to the search heuristic. The search heuristic will be discussed
in Section 3.5. Table 6 shows the example network’s single-target scenarios ranked by
utility score. For utility score screening, if 𝜇 equals three, then the screening function
will output the following set of targets: {𝑣3 , 𝑣0 , 𝑣4 }. By reducing the target list from
seven to three, the number of possible multitarget scenarios reduces from fifty-six to four,
reducing the solution space for the search heuristic. Setting 𝜇 too low could result in a
small target set that creates a reduced solution space and excludes many of the topscoring scenarios. A 𝜇 too large can increase computation time without a guaranteed
increase in benefit.

Table 6. Utility Scores for Single-Target Scenarios in Example Network
Scenario
x3
x0
x4
x6
x2
x5
x1

Utility Score

𝑈𝑥𝑠

Rank
(by 𝑈𝑥𝑠 )

-0.116
-0.155
-0.172
-0.176
-0.176
-0.190
-0.211

1
2
3
4
4
6
7

3.4.3 SNA Measure Screening
SNA measure screening follows the same process and uses the same
hyperparameter (𝜇) as utility score screening, except that a specified SNA measure is
used to rank the individual targets instead of the utility score to rank scenarios. For
measure screening, the specified measure is calculated prior to node insertion. This is
different from the SNA measures used to calculate the utility score, because those
measures are mostly calculated after agent insertion. For this research, eigenvector
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centrality is utilized as the screening measure, as initial tests showed it performed better
than betweenness and closeness centralities. Table 7 displays the example network’s
individual targets ranked by their initial eigenvector centralities. With a 𝜇 of three, the
reduced target set would be {𝑣5 , 𝑣4 , 𝑣1 }. Like utility score screening, the reduced target
set is passed to the search heuristic.

Table 7. Initial Eigenvector Centralities of Targets in Example Network
Target

Eigenvector
Centrality

v5
v4
v1
v0
v6
v3
v2

0.481
0.435
0.396
0.379
0.359
0.313
0.229

(𝑐𝑖𝑒 )

Rank
(by 𝑐𝑖𝑒 )
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

3.5 Search Heuristic
This study uses two similar heuristics to search the reduced solution space
provided by the three screening functions. Two heuristics are required since neighboraccess screening outputs lists of pre-built scenarios, whereas utility-score and measure
screenings pass a single list of targets, which requires the heuristic to build each scenario
prior to evaluation.
For utility screening and measure screening function, a construction heuristic is
used. Leveraging the observation that high-scoring, multitarget scenarios tend to be
comprised of individually high-scoring targets, the construction heuristic builds insertion
scenarios starting with the highest scoring target based upon the screening function. The
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heuristic moves about the solution space by iterating through the ordered set provided by
the screening function, creating and evaluating one scenario per iteration.
The heuristic performs two runs per target list. The first run builds and evaluates
the two-target scenarios, and the second run builds and evaluates the three-target
scenarios. For the measure screening function, there is a third run that evaluates the
single-target scenarios contained within the target set provided by the screening function.
This step is not required for the utility-score screening target set as they are already
evaluated by the screening function.
Performing the measure-screening function with 𝜇 = 5 on the example network
provides the heuristic with the following target set: {𝑣5 , 𝑣4 , 𝑣1 , 𝑣0 }. The first run of the
heuristic will build and evaluate the following two-target scenarios: (𝑣5 , 𝑣4 ), (𝑣5 , 𝑣1 ),
(𝑣5 , 𝑣0 ), (𝑣4 , 𝑣1 ), (𝑣4 , 𝑣1 ), and (𝑣1 , 𝑣0 ). For the second run, the heuristic will build and
evaluate the following three-target scenarios: (𝑣5 , 𝑣4 , 𝑣1 ), (𝑣5 , 𝑣4 , 𝑣0 ), and (𝑣4 , 𝑣1 , 𝑣0 ).
When applying the heuristic to the three lists provided by the neighbor-access
screening function, the heuristic loses its “construction” characteristic, as the scenarios
are previously constructed within the neighbor-access screening function. The heuristic
still performs a search of the solution space, iterating down the two- and three-target
scenario lists from highest neighbor-access score to the lowest. During each iteration, the
heuristic calculates the utility score for the scenario and compares it to the current best
utility score found so far.
Both forms of the heuristic utilize two hyperparameters. The first, q, controls the
maximum number of iterations the heuristic will perform. The second, t, serves as the
stagnation criteria that will halt the heuristic if a better solution is not found within t
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iterations. Due to there being different numbers of possible two- and three-target
solutions, the analyst can input a different value for q and t for the two-target run and the
three-target run. If the same value of q is used for both runs, a smaller portion of the
possible three-target scenarios are evaluated when compared to the portion of two-target
scenarios evaluated. Allowing two values for q and t allows the analyst to prevent the
above from occurring. The maximum number of iterations used for the two-target
scenario run of the heuristic should not exceed the number of possible two-target
scenarios based on the inputted target set. The same is true for the maximum number of
iterations for the three-target scenario run. When applying the heuristic to the neighboraccess screening lists, the maximum number of iterations should not exceed the number
of top two- and three-target scenarios kept by the neighbor-access screening function.
3.6 Case Study
In this section, the previously discussed methodology is applied to the September
11th Terrorist Network depicted in Figure 12. This network was developed from the
information provided in The 9/11 Commission Report [39]. The undirected network
consists of 69 individuals and 271 edges, resulting in a network density of 0.115. The
edges represent various forms of connection between members and are not weighted.
The average degree within the network is 7.9, the maximum degree is 25, the minimum is
one, and median degree is six.
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Figure 12. Network Depiction of the Terrorists Involved in the September 11th Attacks,
Colored by Member’s Role.

With 69 members in the network, there are 54,809 possible insertion scenarios
when evaluating one-, two-, and three-target scenarios. Table 8 displays the 10 most
advantageous scenarios (greatest utility score) when using an arbitrary cost of 0.2 and
equal weights.

Table 8. Top 10 Scenarios for the 9/11 Network (Cost = 0.2, Equal Weights)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Scenario
x3
x31
x3,31
x3,31,50
x31,50
x50
x3,50
x14
x3,14
x1,3

Targets
N. al Hazmi
K.S. Mohammed
N. al Hazmi; K.S. Mohammed
N. al Hazmi; K.S. Mohammed; U. Bin Ladin
K.S. Mohammed; U. Bin Ladin
U. Bin Ladin
N. al Hazmi; U. Bin Ladin
M. Atta
N. al Hazmi; M. Atta
K. al Mihdhar; N. al Hazmi
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𝑩𝒙𝒔
0.234
0.226
0.445
0.645
0.425
0.213
0.433
0.203
0.423
0.411

𝑹𝒙𝒔
0.390
0.391
0.611
0.817
0.597
0.390
0.611
0.385
0.610
0.602

𝑼𝒙𝒔
-0.078
-0.083
-0.083
-0.086
-0.086
-0.088
-0.089
-0.091
-0.094
-0.096

Table 9 displays the results of both utility screening and measure screening when
applied to the 9/11 network for 𝜇=15. The target lists created by both screening functions
contain the same targets except for two: 𝑣4 and 𝑣46 . The rankings of the targets within
the list are also different. With a target list of size 15, there are 15 one-target, 105 twotarget, and 455 three-target scenarios, for a total of 575 possible scenarios to evaluate
with the search heuristic.

Table 9. Results from Utility Score and Measure Screenings on 9/11 Network (𝝁=15)
Rank
(𝝁=15)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Utility-Score
Screening
Target
v3
v31
v50
v14
v1
v2
v12
v36
v37
v5
v13
v25
v6
v46
v15

Measure
Screening
Target
v31
v50
v14
v3
v36
v12
v1
v13
v25
v2
v5
v37
v15
v4
v6

For the application of the heuristic to the target lists provided by the screening
functions, the maximum number of iterations (q) allowed is 105 for two-target scenarios
and 455 for three-target scenarios. The stagnation criteria (t) is set at roughly 30% of the
maximum allowed iterations, resulting in a stagnation criterion of 30 and 131 for twotarget and three-target scenarios, respectively.
When running the heuristic on the utility screening target list, 31 iterations are
performed for two-target scenarios and 132 for three-target scenarios before the heuristic
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meets the stagnation criteria. The average computational time for both the utility
screening and the heuristic across 10 runs is 0.787 seconds. Table 10 shows which
iteration the heuristic discovered the highest scoring scenario per scenario type. The
early discovery of the highest scoring scenario highlights the observation that high
scoring scenarios consist of individual targets that are scored highly by the screening
criteria. Using the utility screening target list, the first two-target and three-target
scenarios evaluated by the heuristic are the highest scoring for their respective scenario
type.

Table 10. Iteration When Heuristic Evaluates the Highest Scoring Scenario
Utility Screening Target List
Iteration
1
2
3

Two-Target
Scenarios
x3,31

Three-Target
Scenarios
x3,31,50

Measure Screening Target List
Two-Target
Scenarios
x31,50
x31,14
x31,3

Three-Target
Scenarios
x31,50,14
x31,50,3

Utilizing the measure screening target list, the heuristic does not evaluate the
highest scoring scenarios until iteration 3 and 2 for two- and three-target scenarios,
respectively. This results in a total of 33 iterations for two-target scenarios and 133
iterations for three-target scenarios until the stagnation criteria is met. Across 10 runs,
the processing time for the measure screening function and heuristic is 0.617 seconds.
The shorter processing time of measure screening when compared to utility score
screening is a result of the screening functions and not the construction heuristic. Utility
score screening requires the utility score, and all its required measures, to be calculated
once for each node in the network. Therefore, betweenness, eigenvector, and closeness
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centralities are each calculated 69 times for the 9/11 instance. Compare this to the onetime calculation of eigenvector centrality required for measure screening.
When applying neighbor-access screening to the 9/11 Network the following
values for 𝛽 are used: 𝛽1 = 15, 𝛽2 = 105, 𝛽3 = 455. These values align with the total
number of one-, two-, and three-target scenarios that are possible from the utility-score
and measure screening functions when 𝜇=15. Table 11 shows the top ten scenarios for
each scenario type based on the outputs of the neighbor-screening function. The highest
scoring two- and three-target scenarios are highlighted in grey.

Table 11. Neighbor-Access Screening Output per Scenario Type (Top 10)
Rank
(By NeighborAccess Score)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

One-Target
Scenarios

Two-Target
Scenarios

Three-Target
Scenarios

x3
x14
x31
x1
x50
x13
x36
x2
x5
x12

x1,14
x1,31
x3,14
x1,13
x1,50
x3,31
x3,50
x14,50
x1,12
x1,25

x1,14,31
x1,14,50
x1,14,36
x3,14,50
x3,14,31
x1,13,31
x1,13,50
x1,14,44
x1,14,46
x3,13,50

The heuristic completes 36 iterations searching the two-target scenarios list and
136 iterations on the three-target list before meeting the stagnation criteria. The average
processing time across the ten runs is 0.831 seconds. Reviewing Table 11, it can be
observed that the heuristic finds the highest scoring two-target scenario on the sixth
iteration. This scenario is also the global optima for all two-target scenarios. For threetarget scenarios, the heuristic finds the highest scoring scenario on iteration five.
Unfortunately, this is not the global optima for three-target scenarios. Scenario 𝑥3,31,50 is
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the global optima for three-target scenarios and the heuristic would have to conduct at
least 401 iterations to discover this scenario based on its placement on the scenario list
provided by the neighbor-access screening.
Table 12 displays the accuracy of each of the screening functions and the search
heuristic. Accuracies are calculated by comparing the screening heuristics’ outputs with
that of a “brute force” all-scenarios model that calculates the utility score for all possible
scenarios. Accuracy measurements are taken for the top 1, 5, 10, 25, and 50 scenarios
when compared to those found by the all-scenarios model. For example, if the screening
heuristic finds 4 out of the 5 top scenarios, then its accuracy for Top 5 is 0.80.

Table 12. Accuracy of Screening Functions for 9/11 Network
Screening
Function
Utility-Score
SNA Measure
Neighbor-Access

Top 1
1.00
1.00
1.00

Top 5
1.00
1.00
0.60

Accuracy
Top 10
1.00
0.90
0.70

Top 25
1.00
0.92
0.56

Top 50
1.00
0.92
0.56

CPU
Time (s)
0.787
0.617
0.831

Reviewing the results in Table 12 reveals that for this problem instance, utilityscreening is the most accurate. Measure screening maintains an accuracy of 0.90 through
the Top 50. Neighbor-Access barely surpasses 0.50 for the Top 25 and 50. Accuracy of
neighbor-access can be improved by increasing the stagnation criteria and the maximum
number of iterations for its heuristic.
As discussed before, this research is not solely interested in finding the global
optima, but instead interested in finding a specified number of top scoring insertion
scenarios that can be provided to intelligence analyst for further analysis and decision.
For example, the top three targets highlighted in this case study are Nawaf al Hazmi,
Khalid Sheik Mohammed, and Usama Bin Laden. All three of these individuals are key
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members within the 9/11 network. These targets would garner extensive intelligence
information, but the risk to the insertion agent would be too great. Understanding the
structure of the network provides insight into why these individuals were selected as the
highest scoring targets. First, the diameter of the network is only five, meaning that the
maximum number of edges between any two members within the network is five.
Additionally, the average degree within the network is 7.9. The degrees of the three
individuals are all over 20. These factors help to increase the target’s utility scores when
compared to other members of the network. To counter these effects, the weights within
the utility function can be altered to emphasize different aspects in the hopes of obtaining
different scenarios.
3.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the methodology used for this research. It provided a
discussion on the development of the scoring method for insertion scenarios utilizing risk
and benefit scoring equations, which together form the overall utility score for each
scenario. Three screening functions, utility-score, measure, and neighbor-access, were
developed to decrease the solution space prior to applying a search heuristic. The chapter
also discussed the operations of the search heuristics used for this research. Finally, the
methodology was applied to the September 11th Terrorist Network case study to illustrate
this methodology in action.
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IV. Analysis and Results

4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter details the testing of the three screening heuristics and provides
analyses of factors that affect heuristic performance. The chapter starts with a discussion
of the testing plan. This is followed by evaluation of the effects that utility function
parameters and heuristic hyperparameters have on heuristic performance. This
information then informs the settings used for the overall performance evaluation of each
screening heuristic. The chapter concludes with analysis of network characteristics that
affect accuracy of the heuristics and an estimation of performance on larger networks.
4.2 Testing Plan Overview
For this study, testing consisted of four stages. The first two stages test the effects
of the utility function parameters and the heuristic hyperparameters on the accuracy of
the three screening heuristics. The information gained during stage one and two
influenced the values used for the parameters and hyperparameters in stage three. Stage
three testing evaluates the accuracy and computational time required for each heuristic.
Stage four will evaluate network factors that affect heuristic accuracy.
For stage one and two of testing, eighteen benchmark networks were used, created
using three network generators from Python’s NetworkX [40] module: Erdős–Rényi (ER),
relaxed caveman (RC), and Barabási-Albert (BA). Table 13 shows the benchmark
networks used for this analysis and their respective characteristics. For all graph types, n
is the number of nodes in the network and seed is the seed number for replication. For
ER graphs, p is the probability that an edge is formed during generation, but for RC
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graphs p is the probability that an edge is rewired to a node outside of its cluster.
Additionally, for RC, k is the number of nodes per group and l is the number of groups.
BA graph generation utilizes m the number of edges to connect from a new node to
existing nodes.

Table 13. Benchmark Network Information
Network
Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Network
Generator
BA
BA
BA
BA
BA
BA
RC
RC
RC
RC
RC
RC
ER
ER
ER
ER
ER
ER

n

p

k

l

m

Seed

50
50
100
100
200
200
50
50
105
140
200
200
50
50
100
100
200
200

0.25
0.25
0.35
0.25
0.20
0.20
0.10
0.25
0.10
0.25
0.10
0.25

10
5
7
20
10
20
-

5
10
15
7
20
10
-

3
6
3
6
3
6
-

326
439
48
35
402
375
549
733
85
763
472
460
137
277
247
145
19
160

Stage three of testing utilizes 18 trials, each using the same network settings as
the benchmark networks, with two exceptions. First, each trial will consist of multiple
runs, with each run consisting of a different randomly generated graph. Second, the
utility score parameters and heuristic hyperparameters values used during stage three will
be informed by the results of previous stages. Stage four will then use the outputs of
stage three to determine what network factors affect the accuracy of each heuristic. More
details on each stage’s testing procedures are found in their respective sections.

52

4.3 Testing of Utility Score Parameters
Prior to evaluating the performance of the screening heuristics, the utility score’s
cost factor and weights are evaluated to understand their effects on the ranking of
scenarios.
4.3.1 Cost Factor
As discussed in Chapter III, the cost factor is used in the utility score function to
model the risk associated with developing multiple relationships within a scenario.
Without the cost factor, the algorithm is biased towards the scenarios with the most
targets. By simple deduction, it can be reasoned that a high cost factor can bias the
algorithm towards one-target scenarios, and a low cost factor can bias the algorithm
towards scenarios with the highest number of targets. The purpose of this evaluation is to
determine the range at which the cost factor limits bias by the algorithm and the top
scoring scenarios are a mix of scenario types. Removing the bias of the algorithm is
important to ensure each scenario type is treated equally by the algorithm and to remove
the advantages three-target scenarios have over two-target scenarios, and two-target
scenarios over one-target scenarios, due to nature of the utility function without the cost
factor.
To perform this evaluation, a bracketing technique was used to find the window
of cost factor values that produced the least bias, or an even mix of one-, two-, or threetarget scenarios. For each cost factor value used during bracketing, each scenario’s
utility score was updated, and the scenarios were sorted from largest to smallest
according to their utility score. Then the number of each type of scenario in the top n
was recorded. This results in a range of cost factors where there are a mix of scenario
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types in the top n scenarios. The maximum cost factor value within this range results in a
majority (greater than 95%) of one-target scenarios with one or two two-target scenarios.
Cost factors greater than this value result in all one-target scenarios in the top n. The
minimum cost factor value results in a majority of three-target scenarios with one or two
two-target scenarios present. Values less than this range results in all three-target
scenarios. The prime cost factor value is where the least bias and the most balanced mix
of one-, two-, and three-target scenario types occurs. Table 14 shows the cost factor
ranges (maximum, minimum, and prime) for the benchmark networks and the density,
diameter, and average degree of each network.

Table 14. Cost Factor Ranges for Benchmark Networks
Network
Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Cost Factors
Minimum Prime Maximum
0.090
0.240
0.390
0.090
0.195
0.300
0.120
0.245
0.370
0.070
0.185
0.300
0.090
0.250
0.350
0.060
0.180
0.300
0.090
0.155
0.230
0.170
0.240
0.350
0.070
0.135
0.210
0.047
0.054
0.065
0.050
0.080
0.120
0.040
0.048
0.065
0.110
0.185
0.280
0.080
0.115
0.150
0.060
0.080
0.120
0.045
0.058
0.085
0.045
0.057
0.070
0.030
0.034
0.043

Range
Length
0.300
0.210
0.250
0.230
0.260
0.240
0.140
0.180
0.140
0.018
0.070
0.025
0.170
0.070
0.060
0.040
0.025
0.013

Network
Density
0.12
0.22
0.06
0.11
0.03
0.06
0.18
0.08
0.07
0.14
0.05
0.10
0.10
0.26
0.10
0.26
0.10
0.25

Network
Diameter
4
3
4
3
5
4
4
8
6
3
6
4
5
3
4
3
3
2

Average
Degree
5.64
10.60
5.82
11.30
5.90
11.60
9.00
4.00
6.00
19.00
9.00
19.00
4.72
12.56
10.10
25.60
20.00
50.40

Figure 13 shows the effect of changing the cost factor on utility scores per
scenario type in Benchmark Network 3, which was selected to represent the effects seen
across all benchmark networks. The red line indicates the utility score of the 100th
ranked scenario. At a cost factor of 0.12, the top 100 scenarios consist of 4 two-target
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and 96 three-target scenarios. As the cost factor increases, the mix of scenario types
within the top 100 changes, with an increasing number of one-target scenarios entering
the top 100 and three-target scenarios exiting. At a cost factor of 0.37, the mix has
switched to 96 one-target and 4 two-target scenarios. As expected, as the cost factor
increases, the utility scores of all scenarios decrease. Similar results were seen in all
benchmark graphs.

Figure 13. The Effect of Cost Factor Values on Scenario Utility Scores in Benchmark
Network 3

Figure 14 shows the effects of a network’s density and average degree on the
prime cost factor value. In each graph, points are sized according to the number of nodes
in the network. The lines connecting points, connect points representing networks of the
same size. When comparing networks of the same type and size, increasing either
network density or average degree results in a decreased prime cost factor value.
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Figure 14. Effects of Network Density & Average Degree on Prime Cost Factor Value
(Point Size Reflects Network Size).

Figure 14 further reveals that cost factors for BA graphs are less affected by
network size than ER and RC graphs. Both ER and RC graphs have smaller cost factors
values for larger networks. This could be the result of BA graphs maintaining similar
network structures despite size.
After looking at the effects of different cost factors on the utility score, the
screening heuristics were run using varying values of the cost factors to determine if there
is any relationship between cost factor values and heuristic accuracy. Utilizing the
benchmark graphs, the screening heuristics were run five times each, using one of five
cost factors. The cost factors utilized were within the ranges presented in Table 14 for
each respective network. The maximum, minimum, and prime cost factors in the ranges
were used, along with the two midpoints of the prime and extreme cost factors in the
range.
The results show that a high cost factor can have an effect on the accuracy of the
heuristic, but it depends on the value of 𝜇 or 𝛽1 and the number of top scenarios being
compared. If a 100-node network is being evaluated by measure screening with a 𝜇 = 15
and the top 50 scenarios are being compared to those of the all-scenarios model, the
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greatest accuracy the heuristic can achieve is 0.3 (15 out of 50). The accuracy could be
lower depending on which one-target scenarios are kept by the screening mechanism.
With a high cost factor, the top 100 scenarios found by the all-scenarios model will be all
one-target scenarios. With a 𝜇 = 15 the heuristic will only evaluate 15 one-target
scenarios, resulting in the top 100 scenarios consisting of only 15 one-target scenarios
and the remainder being either two- or three-target scenarios. Therefore, when
comparing the top 50 scenarios from the heuristic with those from the all-scenarios
model, only 15 of the 50 scenarios will match. The accuracy will increase as 𝜇 increases
or the number of scenarios being compared decreases.
For the utility-score screening heuristic, this is not the case. Due to the nature of
the screening function, the utility scores for all one-target scenarios are calculated during
the screening step. This is prior to creating a reduced target list that is passed to the
heuristic. The utility scores for the one-target scenarios not selected by the screening
function are kept and ranked with all other scenarios evaluated by the heuristic.
Therefore, with a network size greater than 50, if all scenarios in the top 50 are one-target
scenarios, the utility-screening heuristic will have an accuracy of 1.0.
In summary, for a given network instance, there is a range of cost factor values
that provide a mix of one-, two-, and three-target scenarios. Values greater than this
range bias one-target scenarios, resulting in the top n scenarios being all one-target
scenarios, while values less than this range favor three-target scenarios and result in the
top n scenarios consisting of all three-target scenarios. Both density and average degree
all affect the prime cost factor value for a network.
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4.3.2 Weights
To evaluate the effect of the various weights within the utility function, a process
similar to evaluating the cost factor effects is used. Utilizing the benchmark networks,
the utility scores were first calculated using all weights equal to 0.5. Then each pair of
weights (𝑤𝐵 & 𝑤𝑅 , 𝑤𝑒 & 𝑤𝑏 , 𝑤𝑐 & 𝑤𝛾 ) were tested with values of 0.75 and 0.25, in both
configurations. For instance, 𝑤𝑒 was set to 0.75 and 𝑤𝑏 set to 0.25. In the next iteration,
the values were switched, so 𝑤𝑒 = 0.25 and 𝑤𝑏 = 0.75. Then 𝑤𝑐 and 𝑤𝛾 were
evaluated, followed by 𝑤𝐵 and 𝑤𝑅 . During each evaluation, the mix of scenario types in
the top n were calculated, in addition to the specific scenarios that were within the top 10.
The following example discusses specifically Benchmark Network 9, but similar results
were observed for all benchmark networks.
Figure 15 displays the effect of changing a specific weight on the mix of scenario
types within the top 100 scenarios for Benchmark Network 9. The red data points
represent the top 10 scenarios when all weights are equal to 0.5 and continue to represent
the same scenarios throughout all other graphs. This allows the reader to see how the top
scenarios change with the weights. The green horizontal line represents the utility score
of the 100th ranked scenario given the specific weight modification noted in the
individual graph’s title.
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Figure 15. Changing the Weights within the Utility Function can also Bias the Algorithm,
Similar to the Cost Factor
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For two of the three sets of weights (𝑤𝐵 & 𝑤𝑅 , 𝑤𝑒 & 𝑤𝑏 ) in Benchmark Network
9, increasing the value of one of the weights above 0.5 biases the algorithm towards onetarget scenarios and by increasing the other weight value above 0.5, causes the algorithm
to be biased toward three-target scenarios. In the graphs above, when 𝑤𝑒 = 0.75 and
𝑤𝑏 = 0.25, the top 100 scenarios consist of mainly three-target and a few two-target
scenarios. Conversely, when 𝑤𝑏 = 0.75 and 𝑤𝑒 = 0.25, one-target scenarios are
favored. The same occurs when evaluating 𝑤𝐵 and 𝑤𝑅 .
Changing the values 𝑤𝑐 and 𝑤𝛾 has less of an effect on the mix of scenario types
within the top 100. When weights are equal and the cost factor is 0.135, there are 37, 22,
and 41 one-, two-, and three-target scenarios within the top 100, respectively. When
𝑤𝑐 = 0.75, the mix becomes 48, 22, and 30. For 𝑤𝛾 = 0.75, the mix is 26, 22, and 52.
Changing these two weights does slightly bias the algorithm to a certain scenario type,
but not to the extent of the other weight sets, where the top 100 mix is either almost all
one-target scenarios or almost all three-target scenarios. Furthermore, when all other
weights are set at 0.5 each, there is no value between zero and one where 𝑤𝑐 , and
conversely 𝑤𝛾 , forces the scenarios in the top 100 to be either almost all one-target or
almost all three-target scenarios like the other two sets of weights.
When comparing the top 10 scenarios after each weight change, the top scenarios
consisted of the same targets, with one exception. When 𝑤𝑅 = 0.75, scenarios consisting
of different targets entered the top 10. This can be seen in Figure 15 by tracking the
movement of the red data points. Figure 16 displays zoomed in versions of certain
graphs from Figure 15. Please note that each graph in Figure 16 has a different vertical
scale.
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Figure 16. Increased Fidelity of Certain Graphs from Figure 9 to Highlight the Unique
Effect when Risk Weight 𝑤𝑅 = 0.75 (Top Left)

Like cost factor values, there is a range of values for each weight where a mix of
scenario types exist. For Benchmark Network 9, the range for 𝑤𝑒 is from 0.3 to 0.75.
Values below or above this range will result in either all one-target scenarios or all threetarget scenarios, respectively. Conversely, the range for 𝑤𝑏 is 0.7 to 0.25. For 𝑤𝑐 and
𝑤𝛾 , there is no value between zero and one that causes the top 100 scenarios to be either
all one-target or all three-target scenarios. Network size does influence the length of the
weight ranges. Smaller networks tend to have a wider range of weight values where
scenario type mixing occurs when compared to larger networks where the range is
smaller.
After reviewing the effects of both the weights and the cost factor on the mix of
scenario types within the top n scenarios, it is recommended that the weights are
established before the cost factor. The analyst should first establish the weights to
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emphasize specific measures within the utility function, then set the cost factor to tune
the scenario type mix within the desired top range of scenarios.
4.4 Hyperparameters
The purpose of testing the hyperparameters is to determine a balance between
processing time and accuracy of the heuristics. It is proposed that increasing the values
of all the hyperparameters would increase the accuracy of the screening heuristics.
Keeping more targets after screening increases the likelihood that a top scenario is
discovered by the heuristic. Matched with an increased q (stagnation criteria) and t
(maximum iterations), it is expected that the heuristic will have an increased accuracy.
Yet, this increased accuracy would result in increased processing time since more
iterations will be performed. Therefore, this research tests the hyperparameters to find
the respective values that provide a suitable balance between accuracy and processing
time.
4.4.1 𝝁 and 𝜷
The hyperparameters 𝜇 and 𝛽 determine the number of targets or scenarios that
are passed from the screening function to the heuristic. 𝜇 is used by both utility-score
and measure screening functions. It determines the number of top targets, per the
screening criteria, that are passed to the heuristic. 𝛽 is used by neighbor-access screening
and consists of three values: 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3, which determine the number of top one-,
two-, and three-target scenarios, respectively, that are passed to the heuristic.
To test 𝜇 and 𝛽, multiple iterations of the heuristics were conducted at increasing
values based on specified percentages of n, the total number of targets in a network. For
the benchmark networks, 𝜇 and 𝛽1 were varied between 15% and 50% of n in steps of
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5%. To ensure consistency between the three screening heuristics, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 were set to
the total number of two-target and three-target scenarios that can be created using 𝜇
targets. This will allow neighbor-access screening to produce the same number of twoand three-target scenarios as that of utility-score and measure screening. This is
important, as during the testing of 𝜇 and 𝛽, both q and t will be set equal to the maximum
number of possible two- and three- target scenarios based on the values of 𝜇 and 𝛽.
The outcomes from testing 𝜇 and 𝛽 serves two purposes. One is to understand
how changing their values affect the accuracy of the heuristics. The second is to
determine a value for 𝜇 and 𝛽 for follow-on testing of the stagnation criteria and final
heuristic performance. The percentage of n at which all three heuristics achieve a 0.90
accuracy will be the selected values for 𝜇 and 𝛽 moving forward.
Figure 17 shows the average accuracy of each heuristic across all benchmark
networks when 𝜇 and 𝛽 are set to a given percentage of n. As suspected, as 𝜇 and 𝛽
increase in value, their respective screening heuristics increase in accuracy. Neighboraccess’ (NA) lower accuracy is due to its performance when dealing with networks
generated by the RC technique. This will be discussed later in the chapter. Removing
the performance on the RC networks, NA’s average accuracy increases from 0.71 to 0.90
at 25% and 0.83 to 1.00 at 50%.
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Figure 17. As 𝜇 and 𝛽 Increases, the Average Accuracy of the Heuristic Increases
As mentioned previously, the percentage of n at which all three heuristics achieve
0.90 accuracy will be selected as the value for 𝜇 and 𝛽 for future testing. Since NA
screening does not achieve 0.90 within the selected range of percentages due to its
performance with RC networks, the point where NA achieves 0.90 accuracy without the
RC networks is used. This results in 25% of n as the value of 𝜇 and 𝛽 in future testing.
4.4.2 Stagnation Criteria
To test the stagnation criteria for the screening heuristics, a similar approach to
the testing of 𝜇 and 𝛽 was used. All three screening heuristics were run on all eighteen
benchmark networks using the network’s prime cost factor, equal weights, and 𝜇 and 𝛽1
equal to 25% of n. 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 were set to the total number of possible two-target and
three-target scenarios based on the values of 𝜇 and 𝛽1. For the stagnation criteria (q), the
two-target search and three-target search stagnation criteria were both set at a percentage
of the total number of possible two- and three-target scenarios based on 𝜇 and 𝛽 values.
The percentages ranged from 10% to 60% in 5% increments, resulting in 11 runs per
benchmark network.
Figure 18 shows the results of the stagnation criteria tests. Again, both utilityscore and measure screening perform well, with both achieving a 0.90 average accuracy
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at stagnation criteria equal to 15% of possible scenarios. Again, NA performs poorly on
the RC networks. Removing these benchmark networks from the average accuracy
calculation results in a 0.90 accuracy average for NA occurring at a stagnation criteria of
50%.

Figure 18. As t (Set as the Percentage of Possible Scenarios) Increases, there is Only a
Slight Increase in Heuristic Accuracy.

Like 𝜇 and 𝛽, the goal with the stagnation criteria testing is to find the lowest
percentage where all screening heuristics achieve an average accuracy of 0.90 across all
benchmark networks. Unfortunately, similar to 𝜇 and 𝛽 testing, this does not occur
within the specified interval for testing, due in part to NA’s performance on RC
benchmark networks. To achieve the desired 0.90 accuracy, the RC networks were
removed from the average calculation, resulting in a 0.90 average accuracy occurring at
50%. At a stagnation criteria of 50% of possible two- and three-target scenarios, there is
still a large computational time requirement for larger graphs. Reducing the desired
average accuracy level from 0.90 to 0.85 allows for a further reduction of the stagnation
criteria from 50% to 25%, which will be used for the performance testing of the screening
heuristics.
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4.5 Screening Heuristic Performance Testing
To test the performance of each screening heuristic, 18 trials were conducted on
networks with similar parameters as the benchmark networks. Table 15 contains the
values for the network generation parameters and the heuristic hyperparameters for each
trial. The prime cost factor values from Table 14 were used for each respective graph,
and all weights were equal to 0.5. Trials were conducted on a Dell Inspiron 5515 Laptop
with 16 GB of RAM and an AMD Ryzen 7 5700U (1.8GHz) processor. The Python code
is provided in Appendix A.

Table 15. Trial Parameters
Trial

Network

n

p

k

l

m

𝝁

𝜷𝟏 , 𝜷𝟐 , 𝜷𝟑

q

t

Runs

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

ER
ER
ER
ER
ER
ER
RC
RC
RC
RC
RC
RC
BA
BA
BA
BA
BA
BA

50
50
100
100
200
200
50
50
105
140
200
200
50
50
100
100
200
200

0.10
0.25
0.10
0.25
0.10
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.35
0.25
0.20
0.20
-

10
5
7
20
10
20
-

5
10
15
7
20
10
-

3
6
3
6
3
6

13
13
25
25
50
50
13
13
27
35
50
50
13
13
25
25
50
50

(13, 78, 286)
(13, 78, 286)
(25, 300, 2300)
(25, 300, 2300)
(50, 1225, 19600)
(50, 1225, 19600)
(13, 78, 286)
(13, 78, 286)
(27, 351, 2925)
(35, 595, 6545)
(50, 1225, 19600)
(50, 1225, 19600)
(13, 78, 286)
(13, 78, 286)
(25, 300, 2300)
(25, 300, 2300)
(50, 1225, 19600)
(50, 1225, 19600)

(20, 72)
(20, 72)
(75, 575)
(75, 575)
(307, 4900)
(307, 4900)
(20, 72)
(20, 72)
(88, 732)
(149, 1637)
(307, 4900)
(307, 4900)
(20, 72)
(20, 72)
(75, 575)
(75, 575)
(307, 4900)
(307, 4900)

(78, 286)
(78, 286)
(300, 2300)
(300, 2300)
(1225, 19600)
(1225, 19600)
(78, 286)
(78, 286)
(351, 2925)
(595, 6545)
(1225, 19600)
(1225, 19600)
(78, 286)
(78, 286)
(300, 2300)
(300, 2300)
(1225, 19600)
(1225, 19600)

100
100
100
100
20
20
100
100
100
80
20
20
100
100
100
100
20
20

For each trial, multiple runs were conducted. Each run consisted of a different
randomly generated network based on the trial’s specific parameters in Table 15. For
each run the utility scores for all scenarios in the network were calculated using the
“brute force” all-scenarios model. The three screening heuristics were run on the
network using the hyperparameters listed for the respective trial in Table 15. Finally, the
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heuristics’ top 1, 5, 10, and 25 results were compared to that of the all-scenario’s model.
The running of the all-scenarios model was the major time driver for each run. For
instance, Trial 12 averaged 2.64 hours of processing time per run to execute each run’s
all-scenarios model.
The initial goal for each trial was to conduct 100 runs. Due to time constraints,
this was not achievable for the larger networks. For the 200-node network trials, only 20
runs per trial were conducted. For Trial 10, 80 runs were conducted. For all but three
trials (6, 11, and 12), based on an error criteria of 𝜀 = 0.05, the number of runs
conducted per trial were sufficient to achieve a 95% confidence interval based on
𝑡𝛼⁄2,𝑅0−1 𝑆0 2
)
𝑅≥(
𝜀

(4.1)

where 𝑡𝛼⁄2,𝑅−1 is the Student’s t-statistic, 𝛼 is the significance level (𝛼 = 0.05), 𝑅 is the
number of initial replications, and 𝑆0 is the standard deviation of the runs [41]. For the
three trials that did not meet the minimum required number of runs, only one heuristic in
each trial required the additional runs. For Trial 11 and Trial 6, NA required more than
20 runs, and for Trial 12, measure screening (MS) required more than 20 runs.
The following sections discuss the results of the screening heuristics’ performance
with respect to accuracy and computational time.
4.5.1 Accuracy Results
Accuracy of the heuristics were calculated by comparing the top 1, 5, 10, and 25
scenarios as determined by the heuristic and comparing those to the actual top 1, 5, 10,
and 25 scenarios as determined by the “brute force” all-scenarios model. Accuracy is the
number of scenarios that are present in both the heuristic’s top scenarios list and the all-
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scenarios model’s top scenario list. This number is then divided by the top number of
scenarios being compared (1, 5, 10, or 25) to give the heuristic’s accuracy. For each trial,
the runs’ accuracies were averaged, and the 95% confidence intervals (CI) were
determined using a significance level of 0.05 and the Student’s t-test statistic. Table 16
displays the average accuracy for the top 25 and 95% CI for each screening heuristic
during each trial. Grey highlight indicates when a screening heuristic has a significantly
higher average accuracy, based on the t-test, than the other two heuristics for that trial.

Table 16. Average Accuracy with 95% CI per Trial and Screening Heuristic
Considering Top 25 Scenarios (Grey Highlight Indicates Significantly More
Accurate Heuristic During Trial)
Trial

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

n

50
50
100
100
200
200
50
50
105
140
200
200
50
50
100
100
200
200

Average
Density
0.101
0.251
0.100
0.251
0.100
0.250
0.183
0.081
0.057
0.136
0.045
0.095
0.115
0.216
0.059
0.114
0.030
0.058

Neighbor-Access Accuracy
(95% Confidence Interval)

Utility-Score Accuracy
(95% Confidence Interval)

Lower
Limit
0.495
0.532
0.573
0.599
0.948
0.745
0.365
0.137
0.464
0.257
0.335
0.211
0.881
0.875
0.988
0.995
-

Lower
Limit
0.958
0.994
0.992
0.991
0.998
0.694
0.999
0.896
0.990
0.926
0.921
0.992
0.997
-

Mean
0.522
0.543
0.616
0.634
0.966
0.828
0.378
0.158
0.507
0.283
0.432
0.258
0.898
0.891
0.992
0.997
1.000
1.000

Upper
Limit
0.549
0.554
0.658
0.669
0.984
0.911
0.392
0.178
0.550
0.308
0.529
0.305
0.915
0.907
0.996
1.000
-

Mean
0.969
0.996
0.996
0.994
1.000
1.000
0.999
0.735
1.000
0.932
0.996
0.970
0.938
0.996
0.998
1.000
1.000
1.000

Upper
Limit
0.980
0.999
1.000
0.998
1.000
0.776
1.000
0.968
1.000
1.014
0.955
0.999
1.000
-

SNA Measure Accuracy
(95% Confidence Interval)
Lower
Limit
0.835
0.632
0.995
0.969
0.491
0.587
0.938
0.551
0.948
0.573
0.918
0.919
0.998
-

Mean
0.861
0.664
0.997
0.977
1.000
1.000
0.504
0.630
0.951
0.595
0.974
0.672
0.934
0.935
0.999
1.000
1.000
1.000

Upper
Limit
0.888
0.696
1.000
0.984
0.518
0.674
0.963
0.639
1.000
0.771
0.951
0.951
1.000
-

For 50% of the trials, the utility-score heuristic (UT) has a significantly higher
average accuracy than the other two heuristics. For 15 of the 18 trials, NA had a
significantly lower accuracy when compared to the other two heuristics. For five trials
(3, 5, 6, 11, and 13) there is not enough evidence to support that either UT or MS has a
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higher accuracy. The same is true for trials 16, 17, and 18, but for all three heuristics.
These comparisons were made using hypothesis testing with the t-test statistic.
Table 17 shows the screening heuristics’ average accuracies for each network
type for the top 1, 5, 10, and 25 scenarios. These averages were calculated using all trials
for each respective network type. To compensate for the differing number of runs per
trial, 20 runs were randomly selected from each trial for the calculation of the average
and CI. This ensured that each trial was equally represented in the calculations.

Table 17. Utility-Score Screening is Consistently More Accurate Across Different
Network Types (Highlight Indicates Significantly More Accurate Heuristic for
Network Type)

Reviewing the accuracy results from the perspective of network type, emphasizes
the UT’s consistency in accuracy across all network types. For both ER and RC
networks, the UT has a significantly higher average accuracy than the other two
heuristics. All three heuristics perform exceptionally well on BA networks with
accuracies above 0.95.
Figure 19 consists of three boxplots, one for each network type. The boxplot
shows the dispersion of run accuracies per trial (T#) and screening heuristic when
examining the top 25 scenarios. Inconsistency is more prevalent in a trial when there is
greater spread of accuracy values for the trial. These graphs provide insight into the
consistency of the three screening heuristics in terms of accuracy. UT displays the
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greatest consistency of the three heuristics across all network types and sizes. UT does
show some inconsistency with the size-50 ER and BA networks. The greatest
inconsistency displayed by UT is on Trial 8 and 10, both of which are RC networks of
different size and parameters.
Both NA and MS, like UT, show the most consistency with BA networks, and
like UT, do experience some inconsistency with smaller BA networks. NA is
inconsistent for all ER and RC trials. MS is inconsistent for all RC trials and size-50 ER
networks.

Figure 19. Utility-Score Screening Heuristic Maintains the Greatest Consistency Across
All Trials & Network Types
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4.5.2 Time Results
For each run, four processing times were collected, one for each screening
heuristic and one for the “brute force” all-scenarios model. Table 18 shows the 95%
confidence interval for the average processing time for each trial. Overall, a 99%
reduction in processing time is achieved by the three heuristics when compared to the
processing time for the all-scenarios model.

MS CPU Time

(seconds)

(seconds)

(seconds)

(seconds)

95% CI
Lower
Limit
(LL)
13.02
16.38
272.28
429.55
9707.74
16963.90
14.30
13.99
306.11
1726.29
6558.89
9225.80
12.91
17.22
224.95
285.46
5111.81
7516.34

95% CI
Upper
Limit
(UL)

LL

13.24
16.94
276.41
436.69
9852.08
17536.44
14.43
14.30
309.85
1755.44
6661.84
9495.86
13.03
17.53
227.15
289.31
5175.49
7634.52

13.46
17.50
280.54
443.83
9996.43
18108.99
14.55
14.62
313.59
1784.59
6764.79
9765.92
13.15
17.84
229.35
293.16
5239.16
7752.71

0.17
0.24
2.29
4.14
55.97
117.91
0.21
0.17
2.72
14.22
37.60
58.54
0.16
0.22
1.63
2.04
26.02
37.75

UL

LL

0.18
0.25
2.40
4.35
63.55
137.58
0.22
0.18
2.83
14.98
40.59
69.35
0.16
0.23
1.64
2.07
26.44
38.69

0.19
0.27
2.51
4.56
71.13
157.25
0.22
0.19
2.94
15.75
43.58
80.15
0.17
0.23
1.66
2.10
26.86
39.64

0.10
0.13
1.25
2.10
40.31
72.06
0.12
0.11
1.53
10.68
27.75
54.83
0.10
0.13
1.02
1.30
20.55
30.63

UL

LL

Mean

UT CPU Time

Mean

NA CPU Time

Mean

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

All-Scenarios Model CPU Time

Mean

Trial

Table 18. Screening Heuristics Decrease Processing Time by 99% when Compared
to All-Scenarios Model

UL

0.10
0.13
1.28
2.17
41.61
78.46
0.12
0.11
1.57
11.73
30.05
63.33
0.10
0.13
1.03
1.31
20.94
31.25

0.10
0.14
1.30
2.24
42.91
84.86
0.13
0.12
1.61
12.79
32.35
71.83
0.10
0.14
1.04
1.33
21.32
31.86

0.08
0.10
1.13
1.90
39.20
70.51
0.10
0.10
1.41
8.05
26.92
45.98
0.08
0.11
0.92
1.17
20.07
29.73

0.08
0.10
1.15
1.98
39.77
76.72
0.10
0.11
1.46
8.54
28.68
50.80
0.08
0.11
0.93
1.19
20.57
30.25

0.08
0.11
1.17
2.05
40.34
82.93
0.11
0.11
1.51
9.04
30.45
55.63
0.08
0.11
0.95
1.21
21.08
30.77

The performance results show that UT provides the greatest consistency and
average accuracy across all trials and network types, but there is no significant difference
between UT’s and MS’s performance on the largest networks. With respect to time, all
heuristics reduce the required processing time by 99%.
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4.5.3 The Accuracy-Time Trade Space
Within the trade space of accuracy and time, more time does not necessarily
increase accuracy. This is the result of how the screening heuristics operate. At a basic
level, there are two reasons for reduced accuracy. First, if a top scenario or one of its
targets is screened out by the screening mechanism the accuracy will be decreased. Any
top ranked scenario that is screened out will never be evaluated by the heuristic and will
never be included in the final list of scenarios, which reduces the accuracy.

Second, if a

top ranked scenario is positioned near the end of the scenario or target list, it is likely that
the search heuristic will halt prior to the scenario being evaluated. If it is not evaluated
by the heuristic then it is not included in the final ranked list of scenarios, again reducing
accuracy.
To counter the above effects, two actions can be taken. First, 𝜇 or 𝛽 can be
increased allowing for more scenarios to be kept by the screening mechanisms. This
alone will not increase accuracy. Increasing the stagnation criteria, the second action,
will be required to ensure that the new scenarios in the scenario list are evaluated by the
heuristic. Both of these actions will increase the processing time of the screening
heuristics. If, after the increases in the hyperparameters, top scenarios are still screened
out by the screening mechanism the increased processing time will not result in increased
accuracy. Analyst judgement will be required to determine if the additional processing
time is worth the resulting increase in accuracy.
4.6 Analysis of Heuristic Performance
As stated in Chapter I, the purpose of this thesis is to provide a method to reduce
the computational time required to produce a list of the most advantageous insertion
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scenarios within a covert network, while maintaining an adequate overall level of
accuracy. In the above results section, the three screening heuristics presented drastically
reduce the required computational time, but only one heuristic, UT, provides a consistent
and adequate level of accuracy across varying network types. The following analysis
focuses on network characteristics that affect network accuracy. Furthermore, the above
time results will be used to estimate the expected computational time required to evaluate
larger networks than those used within this research.
4.6.1 Network Characteristics and Heuristic Accuracy
Understanding the operations of the screening heuristics provides awareness of
two fundamental reasons why a heuristic might miss a top scenario, and thus reduce its
accuracy. The first reason, which applies to UT and MS, is that a key target is screened
out by the screening function, and therefore not included in the target list that is passed to
the search heuristic. Any scenario that includes that target will now be outside the
solution space, will not be discovered by the heuristic, and will never be evaluated. The
same applies to NA, where if a scenario does not make the lists that are passed to the
heuristic, the scenario will never be discovered and evaluated by the heuristic. The
second reason for a screening heuristic missing a top scenario is that the scenario is
situated too far down the target or scenario list that the heuristic meets the stagnation
criteria and halts before the scenario is up for evaluation.
Despite understanding the above reasons for reduced accuracy, it is important to
understand which network characteristics affect the accuracy of the heuristics. The focus
of the following analysis is to determine network factors that have the greatest effect on
determining a heuristics’ accuracy.
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Upon inspection of the results, it can be noted that both network structure and size
contribute to the accuracy of all three screening heuristics, as all three have a noticeable
decrease in accuracy when evaluating RC networks and networks with 50 nodes. In
comparison, all three heuristics achieve high accuracy when evaluating BA networks.
These insights suggest that certain key measures of network structure, such as degree
distribution, modularity, and network size, can provide a better understanding of the
factors that contribute to heuristic accuracy.
Figure 20 is the correlation matrix that explores the relationships between the
accuracies of the three screening heuristics and key network measures. This matrix was
developed using information from all runs across all trials.

Figure 20. There are Strong & Moderate Correlations (Positive & Negative) Between
Network Characteristics & Heuristic Accuracy

The highest correlation observed between a heuristic’s accuracy and a network
measure is a strong, positive correlation between NA accuracy and degree range, the
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range between the maximum degree and minimum degree in the network. Modularity
and clustering coefficient have a negative, moderate correlation with one or more of the
heuristic accuracies. These results highlight that the structure of the network being
analyzed is a key factor in determining the accuracy of the screening heuristic.
To explore the correlation between accuracy and degree range, graphs are
presented in Figure 21 depicting the relationship between the two. Both NA and MS are
less accurate on networks when there is a smaller range between the maximum and
minimum degree values. Degree range has less of an effect on UT accuracies.

Figure 21. Degree Range has a Strong Correlation with NA Accuracy & Moderate
Correlation with MS Accuracy

The relationship between degree range and accuracy is logical as the screening
criteria for both NA and MS heavily rely on node degree. MS is less affected by degree
range due to eigenvector centrality being a weighted sum of connections compared to the
strict sum of connections in degree centrality. Neighbor-access scores are a mere
extension of the targets’ degrees.
Figure 22 shows the histograms of node degree and neighbor-access scores for
two runs to highlight the effect of degree range on NA accuracy. The left group of
graphs is from Trial 8, Run 52 (RC, 𝑛 = 50, 𝑝 = 0.25, 𝑘 = 5, 𝑙 = 10) which has an
accuracy of zero when evaluated by NA. The right graphs are from Trial 14, Run 24
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(BA, 𝑛 = 50, 𝑚 = 6) which has an accuracy of 1.00 when evaluated by NA. The BA
graph has a larger range of degree values, which results in a wider distribution of
neighbor-access scores. The opposite is seen with the RC graph: a smaller range of
degree values and a narrower distribution of neighbor-access scores.

Figure 22. A Smaller Range of Degree Values Results in a Smaller Range of NeighborAccess Scores, Resulting in Lower NA Accuracy

As discussed in Chapter III, NA screening calculates the scores for all scenarios in
each scenario type (one-, two-, and three-target). Then, within each scenario type, the
scenarios are sorted from highest to lowest by neighbor-access score and the top 𝛽
scenarios are selected. With a narrow distribution of scores, the top 𝛽 scenarios could all
have similar scores, providing little differentiation. Furthermore, randomness is
introduced depending on where the 𝛽 falls, separating the scenarios that are kept and
those that are discarded. For instance, after sorting scenarios by score, if the 25th through
75th scenarios all have the same score and 𝛽 = 50, then half of those scenarios will be
discarded, even though they meet the same criteria as those that are kept. This results in
scenario selection based on how the sorting function operates and not by scenario
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characteristics, therefore increasing randomness in the screening process. This is a
weakness in NA that will need to be addressed in future research.
Network modularity and clustering coefficient were both moderately correlated
with NA and MS accuracy. Unlike degree range, these correlations are negative.
Clustering or the presence of groups within a network can affect heuristic accuracy
similarly to degree range. Members of the clusters or groups tend to be highly connected
to each other, which results in nodes with similar measures and characteristics. This in
turn makes it more difficult for the screening process to differentiate between the nodes,
increasing the likelihood that a key target is excluded from the target list passed to the
heuristic.
Like degree range, neither modularity nor clustering is the single factor that
indicates a heuristics performance, but one of many. This is evident when looking
specifically at the ER trials (green) in the above graphs. The ER networks have some of
the lowest modularity and clustering coefficients of all runs, but NA and MS still struggle
to accurately evaluate these networks. Therefore, there are other factors that contribute to
determining a heuristic’s accuracy.
The final correlated network characteristic is a network’s average shortest path
length (ASPL), which has a moderate negative correlation with UT accuracy. This
correlation is due to UT having a higher average accuracy on BA networks, which have
lower ASPLs when compared to ER and RC networks.
To further explore the relationships between degree range, modularity, clustering,
and ASPL, linear regression was performed to determine which of the network
characteristics are good predictors for accuracy. Additional network measures were
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included in this analysis: network type, density, and number of nodes. Due to
multicollinearity, only network density, modularity, and degree range were included in
the final regression model. When predicting NA, UT, and MS accuracy, all three were
sufficient predictors resulting in an overall 𝑅 2 of 0.91, 0.88, and 0.86 respectively.
The overarching insight gained from the relationship between heuristic accuracy
and the specific network measures is that network type plays an important role in
determining the accuracy of the heuristics. As discussed in Chapter II, BA and RC
networks have specific network characteristics. BA networks are scale-free networks
whose degree distribution follows a power law, resulting in a higher probability of highly
connected hub-nodes and a wider degree range. In addition, the ASPL of BA networks
tend to be small because of the higher number of hub-nodes. The modularity and
clustering coefficients of BA networks are also lower. RC networks on the other hand
are characterized by their high modularity and clustering coefficient. In addition, RC
networks can have high ASPL. ER network generation is more random than the other
two types, and therefore ER networks can potentially take on characteristics of both BA
and RC networks. In Figure 21 there is a discernable difference between the BA and RC
runs, and the respective accuracy of the heuristics when evaluating each network type.
Ultimately, certain network characteristics result in targets of similar measures
and characteristics making it difficult for the screening mechanisms to differentiate
between the individual targets. The differences in the average accuracies of the three
heuristics can be explained by the amount of information captured by their respective
screening criteria. As mentioned before, NA is a modification of the total degree of the
targets within a scenario, resulting in the least amount of information captured about
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those targets and scenario. Measure screening, which uses eigenvector centrality,
captures additional information since eigenvector centrality is a weighted degree of the
targets, taking into consideration the quality of each connection. Finally, UT screening
captures the most information about a target or scenario as it has elements of eigenvector,
betweenness, and closeness centralities. This additional target information allows UT to
differentiate between targets more easily during the screening process.
4.6.2 Estimating Performance on Larger Networks
Using the time results presented in Section 4.5.2, the expected computational time
required for evaluation of larger networks were estimated. These estimates are based on
a 𝜇 and 𝛽 set to 25% of network size and stagnation criteria set to 25% of the possible
scenarios per 𝜇 and 𝛽. The processing times roughly follow a power law distribution.
Figure 23 shows the expected time required to evaluate larger networks using the allscenarios model. For a network of size 500, the estimated time is 135 hours. The time
increases to just under 3,000 hours when evaluating a 1,000-node network.

Figure 23. For a 500-Node and 1,000-Node Network the All-Scenario’s Model Required
Computational Time is 135 Hours and 2,985 Hours, Respectively
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Figure 24 shows the estimated times for the three heuristics. All three heuristics
are estimated to evaluate a 1,000-node network between 5.5 and 7.5 hours.

Figure 24. All 3 Heuristics are Estimated to Evaluate a 1,000-Node Network in Less
Than 8 Hours

These time estimates are for a Dell Inspiron 5515 Laptop with 16 GB of RAM
and an AMD Ryzen 7 5700U (1.8GHz) processor. Applying increased processing power
and leveraging parallel processing can greatly reduce these time estimates.
Estimating the accuracy of the three heuristics is a little more difficult than
estimating time. There was an increase in accuracy seen with all three heuristics when
evaluating the larger networks during testing, which could signal that all three heuristics
will achieve a high level of accuracy on larger networks. More testing is required to
confirm this. It is expected that NA will still perform poorly on larger RC networks,
based on its performance during testing.
4.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter evaluated the effects of changes to the utility function’s cost factor
and weights on the ranking of insertion scenarios. Then the hyperparameters were
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evaluated to understand their effects on heuristic accuracy and processing time. These
findings were included into final performance testing of the three heuristics. The results
were followed by analysis of network characteristics and their effects on accuracy.
Finally, heuristic performance on networks larger than those used during test was
estimated.
Overall heuristic performance varied by heuristic and network types. UT was the
most consistent and achieved the highest average accuracy for two of the three network
types. MS achieved the fast average time for a majority of the trials. All three heuristics
showed that they performed better on the larger networks used during testing.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the conclusions and significance of the research and
highlights future research topics within the realm of node insertion.
5.2 Conclusions of Research
This research presented three screening heuristics to evaluate node insertion
scenarios within a covert network. The three screening heuristics each employed
separate screening criteria ̶ neighbor-access score, utility score, and SNA measure ̶ to
identify the most promising targets or scenarios to reduce the solution space prior to the
application of a search heuristic. The heuristics utilized a quantitative utility scoring
method that consisted of a weighted benefit and risk score, each calculated using
common SNA measures.
The three heuristics were tested on three types of randomly generated graphs,
Erdős–Rényi, Relaxed Caveman, and Barabási-Albert. All three heuristics were
successful in reducing the computational time by 99% when compared to the “bruteforce” all-scenarios model. Only the utility-score heuristic was able to maintain at least a
0.90 average accuracy across all network types when comparing the top 25 scenarios.
The neighbor-access heuristic was the least accurate and most inconsistent of the three
heuristics, achieving an average accuracy of 0.342 ± 0.034 on RC networks, 0.692 ±
0.010 on ER networks, and 0.970 ± 0.010 on BA networks. The SNA measure heuristic
performed well on both ER and BA networks, achieving an average accuracy of 0.916 ±

82

0.027 and 0.981 ± 0.009, respectively, but struggled with RC networks where it only
achieved an average accuracy of 0.720 ± 0.040.
Multiple factors affect the performance of the three heuristics. Characteristics of
a network’s structure, specifically modularity, clustering, degree range, and average
shortest path length, were shown to affect the accuracy of the heuristics by making it
more difficult to differentiate between promising targets or scenarios during the screening
step. In addition, parameters within the utility function and the hyperparameters of the
heuristics can also affect the performance of the heuristics and will require tuning to
obtain the desired balance of accuracy and processing time.
5.3 Significance of Research
This research provides intelligence and law enforcement officials with a
computationally inexpensive method to identify advantageous node insertion scenarios
within a given covert network. This method is not intended to be the deciding factor in
determining which insertion scenario to pursue but should be used in the initial steps of
course of action development. The identified advantageous scenarios will require further
analysis by intelligence and law enforcement SMEs to ensure other critical information
and network vulnerabilities are incorporated in the final analysis of the insertion
scenarios. The presented methods are developed to provide the intelligence and law
enforcement analysts with a quick and quantitative method to down select the number of
potential node insertion scenarios, reducing time requirements for follow-on analyses.
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research
This thesis serves as an initial foundation for research of node insertion into
covert networks for the purpose of disruption or information gathering. There are many
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directions that can be taken for future research into this subject area, and many include
methods that were discussed in Chapter II for network disruption through node deletion.
Directly related to this research is operationalizing the heuristics into a tool that
can be easily operated by an intelligence or a law enforcement analyst. This would
require the development of a graphical user interface that would allow the analyst to build
a model of the covert network, establish parameters and hyperparameters, and then apply
the heuristic evaluation method to output advantageous insertion scenarios.
This research is limited in its approach as it only utilizes static, undirected,
unweighted networks in its development and analysis of the heuristics. Important
network aspects were not included in this analysis that may have dramatic effects on the
selection of advantageous insertion scenarios. These include geographical location of
network members, strength and type of relationships between members, and attributes of
each member. Future research can build upon this study by incorporating these aspects
into the network models, and then modifying the presented heuristics to accommodate for
the additional information.
A similar approach to that used by Geffre et al. [37] and Carley et al. [35], models
the network by utilizing a meta-matrix approach that captures the member, knowledge,
resources, and task aspects of the network. This approach determines where the
cognitive load and expertise lie within a network. This information can be leveraged for
determining potential node insertion scenarios.
Future research can utilize a multi-layered networking method to incorporate
additional information about the covert network into the network model. This method
splits the network into various layers to capture the different types of connections
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between members. These layers can include cyber, financial, social/familial, and
operational. Future research can study how to perform insertion into one layer in order to
achieve a desired effect in another layer of the network.
A potential area of research could be the study of where to insert an agent when
specifically targeting certain members of a network. Having the agent develop direct
relationships with these targets would be extremely risk. Future research can study where
in the network to insert the agent and then which existing relationships in the network the
agent can leverage to gain access to the targets.
After selecting the most advantageous node insertion scenarios, dynamic
modeling of the network and the use of game theory can be used to simulate each node
insertion scenario, and the network’s response to the insertion. This simulation can help
to further evaluate the risks and benefits of each scenario as well as test potential
insertion strategies.
5.5 Summary
This research presents three screening heuristics to evaluate potential node
insertion scenarios, with one, utility-score screening, being the highest performing and
showing the most potential for evaluating larger networks than those used during this
study. Due to the lack of access to realistic data of covert networks and a method to
evaluate if the utility function properly identifies the highest scored insertion scenario,
the proposed methods of this research are only theoretical. Future research can further
develop various applications within the area of covert network node insertion, providing
better methods for intelligence and law enforcement analyst to leverage when
determining future agent insertion operations.
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Appendix A. Python Code
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disruption operations. Due to the substantial number of potential insertion scenarios in a large network, this research
proposes three screening heuristics that leverage SNA measures to reduce the solution space before applying a simple
search heuristic.
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